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We want to get out, people tell East Berlin regime

During May, June and July, about 400 East Germans are reckoned to have escaped to the West through Hungary to Austria. In June, about 140 East Germans got over or through the fortified walls and fences that cut the communist part of Germany off from the non-communist part. About 130 East Germans are occupying the Bonn diplomatic mission in East Berlin. They want safe passage to the other Germany on the other side of the wall. Another 200 are sitting in in the Bonn embassy in Budapest wanting the same thing. More are in Bonn's Prague embassy. Many of these people are afraid that if they don't act now, the already tough restrictions on travel will be tightened even further and they will never get out until they are pensioners (who can go to the west pretty well as often as they like). This year about 1,500,000 East Germans who are not pensioners will be allowed to the West to visit relatives. The stories on this page and page 3 deal with the rash of emigration and attempted emigration, the causes behind it, what should be done and how Hungary fits into the picture.

It is sheer happenstance that the wave of people wanting to get out of East Germany is coinciding with the anniversary of the Berlin Wall, built on 13 August 1961. But the reminder of this anniversary sets the present events in dramatic perspective.

Then as now, dissatisfaction in the German Democratic Republic was enormous. The answer provided by the Wall amounted to a cementation of the two German states, a perpetuation of the division of Europe and a consolidation of post-war European frontiers at the last point where they were still open.

Now, in comparison, the pressure brought to bear by East Germans wanting to leave and come to the West testifies to shaken foundations of power in the East.

It reveals that the post-war order, with its ideologically motivated demarcation, sealed nearly 30 years ago in Berlin, is in the throes of far-reaching change.

Memories of 13 August 1961 also make clear the explosive force of an issue that is increasingly entering into the debate: that of the consequences changes in Eastern Europe might have for Deutschlandpolitik.

Neither the SPD-FDP Bonn coalition nor its CDU/CSU-FDP successor have pursued a Deutschlandpolitik policy based on the shock the building of the Berlin Wall was for the Germans.

The irrevocable nature of division, so dramatically shown by the Wall, called out for a reappraisal. An attempt to come to terms with the GDR took the place of what had literally been a policy of reunification.

Its aim was to make the intra-German situation somewhat more normal. Now so much that seemed immutable is in the throes of change, is this policy approach still appropriate?

Those who claim it is not may not be gaining in number, but they have gained in self-assurance, and what they demand and envisage is plausible in its way.

Is there not more leeway for politics when the ideology that was to blame for the division of Europe is on the decline, when the power bloc that consolidated the post-war system that has prevailed since Yalta and Potsdam is growing less cohesive?

Is it still necessary, as the raison d'être of the present Deutschlandpolitik, to acknowledge the ideological and power-political division of the world in order to surmount it?

Is there not instead an opportunity now of relying less on interlacing interests to persuade the GDR to be on its best behaviour and to try to come to terms with the Soviet Union instead in order to free the GDR?

In other words, has reunification become a feasible objective once more? It is far from difficult to criticise to the hilt many of the ideas and concepts here used to shake the foundations of the Deutschlandpolitik consensus.

Far too frequently they are based on wishful thinking, and in many ideas nationalism of old on which history has long reached a crushing verdict is resurrected.

But they must not be dismissed too lightly. The mere fact that reunification can now be reconsidered as an immediate Deutschlandpolitik objective reflects the degree of change that would sweep the post-war world of Central Europe if reform in Eastern Europe succeeded.

This emergence of Europe from the spell woven by cold war and ideological confrontation would still not make the Continent a political terrain in which everything was possible that had previously foundered on pact borders and doctrines.

Balance of power and sphere of *influence problems old and new would remain*, just as historical traumas would be sure to survive in strength, especially the ones suffered by Germany's neighbours at German hands during the Second World War. The respective interests of the Soviet Union and the USA in conditions in Central Europe would continue to exist. The dictum that the German Question was not for the Germans alone would by no means have ceased to hold good. One may well doubt whether all this would, as many critics of the resurgence of nation-state thinking feel, rule out German reunification. The Germans are not what they used to be, and Europe too, which would have set aside its experience of totalitarianism, would be a changed continent. Yet even in a changed Europe Deutschlandpolitik would need to retain a cautious gait, taking each step in turn and in its European context. If it were to revert to nation-state policies in the narrower sense of the term, it would threaten to hamper the process of loosening up in Europe, or halt it.

Yet it must foster this very process if it is to promote the interests of Germans on either side of the border.

A mere glance at the present intra-German situation is sufficient to show that a change in Deutschlandpolitik pattern would be sure to have a counter-productive effect.

The policy deliberately pursued by all Bonn governments since the mid-1960s, a policy of taking care not to destabilise the GDR, may arguably have entailed undeserved stability for the GDR leaders, too much, as it were, of a good thing.

But nothing would consolidate the *GDR leaders, and especially the hardliners*, more than a policy aimed straight at bringing about reunification.

The policy that has prompted the change that brought pressure to bear on the GDR's leaders to embark on changes has not been one of confrontation but of rapprochement between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

Above all, the expectation that change in Eastern Europe might permit a policy of reunification raises the issue of whether the Germany reunification is intended to re-establish is still available in the context of two German states.

Have four post-war decades of separate development really counted for so little that the situation which has since arisen could promptly revert to *one* state if only the ideological and power-political circumstances were no longer to apply that have so far ruled reunification out?

Germans on both sides of the border have become what they are today by dint of a process of change. It has led them away from what they once were.

In these circumstances is unity conceivable other than as the result of fresh endeavours, the consequences of which cannot necessarily be foreseen?

Insistence on reunification as the sole yardstick and objective of Deutschlandpolitik conceals what really matters, which is, to quote Willy Brandt, "the degree of national unity that is achievable."

How much that is will depend on the development of European relations and on the Germans themselves, what unity they need for their view of political and social life and how they see themselves.

Only then will we see, sooner or later, whether reunification really does reappear on the day-to-day political agenda.

Hermann Rudolph
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 12 August 1989)

Protest against 28 years of the Wall

A man wrapped in the black, red and gold German flag lies across the line dividing East and West Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie. East German guards look on. (Photo: AP)

IN THIS ISSUE

■ INTERNATIONAL

Allied fears, British views and some ambivalence towards Germany

Ask British politicians about Mikhail Gorbachov and they will soon start talking about a possible disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.

East Germany plays a key role in their conjecture. What is likely to happen there?

East Germany is the lock in the Soviet chain. Will it burst open, and if it does under what circumstances?

The western powers could then be forced to take completely new decisions.

The question of future developments in Eastern Europe and in East Germany conceals the German Question, on which the existence of Nato hinges.

The Federal Republic of Germany is as important for Nato as the control over the territory of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) for the Soviet Union.

Nato was set up in 1949 in order to, in the words of its first secretary-general, Lord Ismay, "keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down."

This famous remark sums up in a nutshell Europe's security problem in the form it assumed after the Second World War.

The uneasy feeling about the German Question would not be so great in the West were it not for the ambivalence in the way other Nato states think and feel about Germany: an ally they need against the Soviet Union and yet an ally which nevertheless worries them. This ambivalence is now becoming more discernible.

During the recent Nato dispute over short-range missiles there were underlying doubts about whether the Germans are really welcome in the alliance and supported by their allies in the German Question or whether they are merely being "used" for outside interests.

The British (and other allies) had their doubts about whether the Germans really wanted to belong to Western Europe of their own free will and on a long-term basis.

This was not just passing ill-feeling, but the manifestation of unsettled historical conflicts and undigested experiences in relations between Germany and other countries during the first half of the century.

Up to now they have been vaulted and covered up by the East-West conflict. Even though he has not budged over the German Question Gorbachov has not only robbed Nato of an enemy, but also taken the lid off slumbering conflicts in Europe.

Western Europeans are now forced to clarify their ideas on Europe's future. It is not enough for Germans to develop ambiguous concepts such as "peace order." They are of little use to the practical Anglo-Saxon way of thinking.

Whitehall realises that Bonn wants to keep the "options" of "creating peace" open by maintaining a noncommittal approach. The reverse side of this approach, however, is its non-determinability and unpredictability.

The British want more than just demands by the Germans for the "self-determination" of the inhabitants of



the GDR, even though this is of paramount importance.

The second step, the joining together of the two Germanies to form one *nation-state* entity would have to be made subject to the free decisions of freely elected parliament. A reunification is to be expected as the natural consequence of free elections.

The third factor is decisive, to begin with for Germany's western neighbours: how will the Germans, once they are no longer threatened by the Soviet Union, shape their future — whether as the Federal Republic of Germany or as a reunified Germany?

Firmly integrated with the West? Or in dreams of a no-man's land and "peace without arms"? Or perhaps in an Eastern Europe from which Moscow has withdrawn and in which the Germans set up their own market or even economic hegemony?

Many people in Britain fear that a united Germany with a population of 75 million people and its economic capacity would above all pose a problem for Europe's balance, even if it were to remain in the framework of the Western European states and especially if it were to move out of this framework to *play the role of a "third power"* in Central Europe. Such fears may sound absurd to German ears.

Nevertheless, they must be taken seriously to understand why Bonn's allies cannot simply view the German Question as an abstract case of the application of the principle of self-determination.

Germany's central location and economic power make the issue a practical question of their own security.

It might be better to raise such fears to the higher level of common European security.

Indeed, it would be neither beneficial for the Germans nor for the peace of the continent if Germans were to regain their unity as the expense of a loss of trust by their neighbours.

Bonn's Deutschlandpolitik must do more than simply keep everything which goes beyond free elections in the GDR open.

The Federal Republic should consider whether it is not better to explain to everybody — including the Germans in the GDR — that it only wants to achieve German reunification on the basis of continued political integration in Western Europe.

Otherwise, things would continue in line with Lord Ismay's remark; continued reservations on the part of Bonn's allies and disappointment on the part of the Germans about their allies.

If Bonn can convince its allies about the long-term nature of its decision for the "West" it can expect more support by its allies over the German Question.

The latter is just as much a West-Western affair as it is a West-Eastern and East-Eastern one.

In the final analysis, Eastern Europe would probably also be more at ease with a Germany which has a lasting "western" stance than if Germany were to try and assume a leading role in Central Europe.

Whether in the eyes of the West or the East, therefore, Bonn should combine its Deutschlandpolitik with the politics of the Nato alliance.

If the Germans start regarding the alliance and German unity as mutually exclusive opposites this would have extremely adverse foreign and domestic policy implications.

The western allies, however, must also rethink old concepts. Aren't British fears about the orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the fuss in the Bonn coalition about Genscher's policies, and the considerations in the SPD about a security policy without nuclear weapons rather exaggerated?

There are other, more tactful ways of cementing Bonn's links with Western Europe.

Despite a certain degree of vacillation by Bonn over defence issues its commitment to Europe is firm.

With an eye to 1992, its economic interests in the West and the intensity of cultural exchange represent a sound basis for a stable relationship to other Western Europeans.

Even if a new constellation of states develops in Europe there will be no re-emergence of the past.

If the day ever comes when the Soviet empire withdraws to behind the River Bug and the Eastern European nations have to be helped out of their problems Europe will nevertheless not be the Europe of the past.

The concern about a resurgence of National Socialism or Wilhelminianism in Germany is just as unwarranted as the fears of a return of Bonapartism in France last century.

It would nonetheless be useful to take a look at some of these spectres during daylight.

Was it always correct to claim that a united Germany would be too great a strain for Europe, a permanent source of insecurity?

Historians from both countries should hold a kind of school-knowledge revision conference with politicians and journalists to make sure that nightmares from the period of the first world war do not sustain a demonic image of Germany.

The best assurance for the British with respect to Germany would be an activation of the policy towards Europe in the European Community.

They must also, albeit in a different sense, commit themselves firmly to Western Europe.

Günther Gillessen

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 5 August 1989)

Wider implications of Austria's bid for EC membership

The author, Renate Hellwig, is a regular columnist for the *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt* and a CDU member of the Bundestag.

It looks as if the appeal of the European Community is growing much faster in the neighbouring states outside the Community than it is inside it.

Austria's application for membership proves the point. It can be considered at the earliest after 1992, when the European internal market comes into existence.

Austria is a member of Efta, the free trade area to which Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland and Switzerland also belong.

Poland and Hungary, both at the beginning of their processes of reform, are already seeking a loose link with Efta.

Up to now, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland previously pointed to their status of neutrality as an argument against accession to the European Community.

The European Community stands at the crossroads in its decision on Austria's request for membership. We, the members of the Community, must decide what we want.

We can only let Austria join if we either drop the goal of a political union or if we demand that Austria drops its neutrality status.

For Austria there is no easy way out of the dilemma of either committing itself entirely to the western system and its defence policy obligations or remaining in the Efta.

A European Community extended to become a political union, surrounded by a loosely linked Efta association, which for its part provides fluid boundaries to neutral states or states which are becoming neutral in the Warsaw Pact, would represent the best solution for the future of Europe.

This is the only way of meeting the challenges of an increasingly interlinked world economy.

Political power in Europe will cease to be a means of controlling economic power if countries lapse back into national particularism and entrust international issues to business groups and the two superpowers.

There is no neutral European Community between East and West because it is too big to demand that the USA should protect its status of neutrality.

Austria will have to decide — either small and neutral or in the European Community and no longer neutral. This perspective, however, also has implications for the German Question. Up to now we have been evading the open dis-

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■ GERMANY

Mission gates shut in bid to defuse refugee crisis

Bonn's decision to close its mission in East Berlin temporarily may sound dramatic. But it is a step aimed at defusing the situation brought about by 130 East Germans squatting there in a bid to be allowed to migrate to the West — and to similar situations in Prague and Budapest.

The Chancellor's Office has pulled the communication cord, but that cannot be a long-term solution. Intra-German relations are difficult and require an operational Bonn mission in East Berlin.

The mission's role, above all its operational role, is jeopardised when growing numbers of East Germans wanting to go to the West use the mission in a bid to make it to the Federal Republic.

The dilemma reflects the situation in East Germany in an age of communist reform bids. These reforms are aimed at ending crises in the socialist states, yet they themselves are in the throes of a crisis.

Mr Gorbachov has his hands full in the Soviet Union. In the GDR, where Erich Honecker and the Brezhnev old guard are still in control, this stalemate has intensified the feeling among those who want to come to the West that now is the time.

There are signs of panic in case this might be the last opportunity. If Gorbachov comes a cropper, many fear the GDR leaders may pull in the reins even tighter.

Even if he were to succeed, the East Berlin leaders might reply by stepping up repression. So a fair number of people feel the time to go is now, while a few loopholes still remain.

The Federal Republic has only limited opportunities of bringing influence to bear. The Chancellor's Office has so far preferred to negotiate discreet solutions for would-be migrants seeking refuge in the Federal Republic's mission in East Berlin or its embassies in other East Bloc countries.

This approach has proved satisfactory, but discreet crisis management grows difficult when 130 people crowd into the mission, as at present.

The figure alone is a political issue, calling the practice so far, that of arranging for would-be migrants to come to the West after a cooling-off period, into question.

Bonn had to weigh the options and has probably arrived at the most sensible solution, both in general terms and in relation to the people immediately affected.

Peace and quiet must be restored if the option of discreet, behind-the-scenes activity is to be retained.

East Germans who want to settle in the West must also appreciate that by squatting in the Federal Republic's mission they are jeopardising much of what has so far been possible.

Attempts to arrive at an understanding with the powers that be in East Berlin must not blind us to the reasons for the unfortunate situation.

In a socialist "family" in the throes of change, the East Berlin leaders rule their state with an iron rod, firmly and complacently convinced that they have always been in the right.

What with the scarcity of goods and prospects, the limitations imposed on freedom of travel and day-to-day tutelage by Party officials, reality belies this claim. There are reasons enough for turning one's back on the "workers' and peasants' state."

The Federal Republic, by virtue of its own role as it sees it, is duty bound to welcome all Germans who want to live here.

What East Berlin propagandists call "intervention in domestic affairs" is for the West a self-evident human right to freedom of movement.

That is why clashes of this kind will recur time and again between the two German states.

There is probably no sure-cure solution to the crisis. Ought we, for instance, to exert pressure on East Berlin to introduce glasnost and perestroika in the GDR?

Not openly, that is for sure. The old GDR leaders nurse their laager mentality and are keen not to lose face — even though they have long lost it in the GDR.

Bonn has made it clear that it has no interest in letting the GDR bleed to death. It is indeed an alarming trend when many able people are keen to leave the country, not least for those who despite the difficulties are determined to stay there.

The atmosphere of resignation is intensified. The alarming vision of a petrified SED, the ruling Communist Party, governing a country that is, once and for all, mediocre and as quiet as the grave could so easily come true.

If fine words of responsibility for Germany as a whole are to have any meaning, then Bonn must bear this risk in mind.

Whatever happwens, what is needed is level-headed, persistent crisis management with a ready ear for cases of individual hardship.

That too is a sense that must not be allowed to atrophy.

Arnd Bäucker

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 9 August 1989)

The pivotal role of Hungary

Hungary was the first East Bloc country unreservedly to accept the provisions of the UN convention on refugees.

One reason was doubtless to qualify for aid from UN refugee funds for the tens of thousands of ethnic Hungarians who have left Rumania to escape from persecution by the Rumanian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu.

Hungary now has a refugee problem of a different kind. It has started to dismantle frontier emplacements along its border with Austria and many East Germans are trying to escape to the West this way.

The elimination of physical barriers does not mean that the Hungarian authorities have stopped trying to prevent illegal border-crossing.

Many East Germans have been caught and sent back by the border patrol and have applied to Bonn's embassy in Budapest for assistance.

They have had their passports stamped by the Hungarian authorities countermanding their visas and making it clear, on their return to the GDR, that they have tried to escape to the West.

For weeks officials at the embassy in Budapest and the Foreign Office in Bonn have sought to persuade the Hungarian authorities to abandon this procedure, which in the circumstances is a breach of the UN convention.

It is doubtful whether all GDR citizens would qualify as political refugees if Hungary made any such provision, but the UN convention also bans forcibly sending refugees back to their countries of origin if they are likely to face persecution there.

By endorsing GDR visitors' visas the Hungarian authorities are virtually making them liable to persecution of this kind.

The Hungarian authorities initially responded to this accusation by not insisting on deporting GDR citizens whose passports had been endorsed in this way.

Budapest then made a surprise announcement that GDR citizens could stay at existing refugee camps in Hungary until their status was clarified, under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Hungary's attempt to abide by its new international obligations despite East Bloc agreements to the contrary will be followed with interest, especially where the GDR's response is concerned.

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 4 August 1989)

Diplomatic moves to ease life for those who stay behind

East Germans squatting in Bonn's Budapest embassy have forced the Bonn government to walk a tightrope.

Bonn is both willing and obliged — by Basic Law, the 1949 Bonn constitution — to help fellow-Germans who want to migrate to the Federal Republic — even if that means through Hungary.

Yet Bonn must also exercise diplomatic restraint to help ensure that these East Germans do not make themselves or the relatives they have left behind liable to persecution.

Last but not least, the Federal government must not use Hungary's policy of opening simply to smuggle out as many people as possible from the GDR via Hungary.

The success of any such policy would be shortlived. Sooner or later East Berlin would make its borders with fraternal socialist Hungary as airtight as its borders with the West.

Bonn has evidently already been notified that a response of this kind is immiment. If the East Berlin regime were to deprive its citizens of the last vestiges of a right that is self-evident for us, the right of freedom to travel, pressure of dissatisfaction would grow still higher in an East Germany where it is already rife.

The key to the solution of the problem is, as so often, in East Berlin, where the powers that be are increasingly isolating themselves from trends in neighbouring socialist countries, opting for rigid isolation, much to the chagrin of the public.

People are keen to make use of any loophole that seems available — until the GDR plugs it. Bonn has realised this is the case and is now engaged in diplomatic approaches to try and negotiate easements for Germans in the GDR. What is happening in Bonn's embassy in Budapest is no sure-cure.

Andreas Fritzenkötter

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 8 August 1989)

Austria, the EC and political aims

Continued from page 2

cussion on the intermediate used the formula that "the reunification of Germany will take place in an overall European framework" to evade an open discussion on the intermediate stages along the way.

The development may soon demand that we make difficult decisions. At the moment the two German states appear to be bogged down in their respective sets of maximum demands.

I am certain that we could and should contribute towards the process of democratisation in the GDR by accepting a GDR which asserts its independence within the Warsaw Pact as one of the intermediate stages.

This also means rejecting any German reunification, even if wanted by most people in the GDR, as long as the two military alliances, the Warsaw Pact and Nato, continue due to the increasingly relaxed yet still persistent confrontation.

As in the days of Adenauer we shall have to say "not yet" to German reunification if the price is the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from Nato and thus virtually from the European Community.

Preparation

This must even then apply if reunification is offered by the USSR and East Germany. The reiteration of this rejection will be even more difficult than during the 1950s.

For this reason it is all the more important to prepare citizens in both countries for such a situation.

A reunified Germany cannot assume the role of trailblazer for the disintegration of the political blocs on its own and detached from its moorings in East and West.

During a transitional period we Germans will have to wait *voluntarily* in two separated states and try to reduce military confrontation until its disappears altogether.

By then will there be any realistic opportunity for a reunification.

Bonn's — unspoken — maximum demand that the GDR should pull out of the Warsaw Pact in a reunification to be effected as soon as possible and then integrated into Nato is unrealistic.

It sounds too aggressive for both East and West.

If we are not really serious about such demands then it is high time that we said so.

Otherwise, we may be steamrollered by events which then trigger panic reactions.

The votes for the Republicans are already a start to such a panic reaction.

We must not make the same mistake made in the case of the influx of ethnic Germans of drifting into the consequences of a successful policy without preparing the population on time for its implications.

Renate Hellwig

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 11 August 1989)

Dr Christian Tomuschat, who wrote this article for *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, holds the chair of public law at the faculty of jurisprudence and political science at the university of Bonn. He is also director of the institute of international law.

■ UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES

Use of German troops is legally conceivable

The United Nations peacekeeping forces protect countries in many parts of the world against the violent eruption of political tension.

This instrument of resolving conflicts was created in 1956. Together with the Israeli advance on the Sinai peninsula British and French troops landed in the Suez Canal zone after it was nationalised by President Nasser.

Today, blue-helmeted UN soldiers are deployed in southern Lebanon, on the border between Israel and Syria along the Golan Heights, in Cyprus, along the Iraq-Iran front line, in Angola and in Namibia.

Other parts of the world would also like UN troops help secure precarious solutions negotiated to settle military conflicts.

There is no express legal basis for the deployment of these troops in the Charter of the United Nations.

The principal responsibility for guaranteeing world peace and international security lies with the UN Security Council.

The authors of the Charter envisaged that the Security Council should either make efforts to find a peaceful solution to conflicts (Chapter VI, Articles 33-38) or, pursuant to Chapter VII (Articles 39-51), use the means at its disposal to take action against threats to or violations of peace or acts of aggression.

The central provision of the original concept is Article 42, according to which the Security Council can take the measures required against an aggressor state with the help of air, naval and land forces.

Up to this very day, however, the system designed to safeguard the general prohibition of the use of force laid down in the UN Charter has only existed on paper.

The superpowers have never been able to reach agreement on the procedural arrangements for such assignments, without which a UN army cannot be created.

The peacekeeping measures of the United Nations, therefore, represent a kind of substitute institution.

The modesty of the underlying objective is above all reflected in the fact that the peacekeeping forces cannot be imposed on any country.

Their deployment is dependent on the approval of the government concerned, which can also express its preferences with respect to the nationalities of the units involved.

The UN soldiers, therefore, never arrive as enemies or occupying forces, but as helpers of the country which requested their presence and its population.

For this reason it is not inappropriate to describe the United Nations in this respect as a service enterprise, which contributes towards stabilising peace and maintaining order if the conflicting parties are unable to do so themselves.

The award of the Nobel peace prize to the UN peacekeeping forces in 1988 symbolically underlined the beneficial influence of the "blue helmets."

Neutral states such as Austria and Switzerland are particularly keen on deploying contingents for such assignments.

Sometimes it is claimed that the deployment of peacekeeping units is covered by a (non-existent) Chapter IVa of the UN Charter.

If the peacekeeping operations are not simply viewed as an automatically permissible deficit in terms of the specifications of Chapter VII it is fair to talk of a development of customary law.

The consent of all UN member states is unanimous. According to the existing stipulations no country can be obliged to assign its troops to peacekeeping operations against its will.

Every assignment is carefully coordinated between the parties concerned; no government is expected to engage in political adventurism.

As the UN peacekeeping forces do not have an offensive task a German contribution towards both the provision of Bundeswehr soldiers as well as the assignment of units of the Federal and Land police forces is conceivable.

The key provision on the permissible assignment of the Bundeswehr is Article 87a of the Basic Law.

Paragraph 2 of this provision runs as follows: "Apart from for defence purposes the armed forces can only be deployed insofar as this is expressly permitted by the Basic Law."

The authors of the constitution intentionally set out to restrict the scope of action of the Bundeswehr. The crucial word in this provision is "deployed."

Deployment is understood to mean the activity of the Bundeswehr in the true sense as an instrument of the power of state.

This is not the case if it only affords technical or logistic assistance, assistance which could afforded just as efficiently by a business enterprise.

The boundaries here are to a certain extent fluid. The Bundeswehr, for example, has often provided aircraft for the transportation of peacekeeping troops from their native countries to their operational area.



This transportation service was not assumed to represent deployment within the meaning of Article 87a, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law.

No-one, however, would question the fact that the use of Bundeswehr units to carry out the proper task of a peacekeeping force, to occupy and control a buffer zone by military means, represents a deployment.

In accordance with the wording of Article 87a, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, therefore, an express norm of authorisation norm is required in such a case.

This norm is specified in Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, according to which the Federal Government can join a "system of mutual collective security in order to maintain peace."

This constitutional provision was designed to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to play a constructive role within the framework of the United Nations.

The wording was strongly influenced by the system outlined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Admittedly, in 1949 the assignment of military contingents was out of the question, since the Bundeswehr was not created until 1955.

However, together with the other Basic Law provisions the decision incorporated into Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law cannot be viewed as a rigid snapshot of the situation in 1949.

The decision to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to join a system of collective security was at the same time a decision allowing the use of the means needed to participate in such a system.

It is obvious that collective security is not possible without an effective military potential.

Since the Bundeswehr was created, therefore, the authorisation of Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law has also extended to the assignment of troops.

This applies to a future United Nations army on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well as to the peacekeeping forces which have become an integral component of the UN peacekeeping system.

Contrary to claims by some members of the Bonn government and the legal community a constitutional amendment is unnecessary.

Due to the required two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and Bundesrat it would at most have political declaraton character.

If the assignment of Bundeswehr soldiers is regarded as constitutionally permissible this does not mean that all obstacles have been removed.

An assignment on behalf of the United Nations additionally requires a clear legal regulation.

It would make sense to fall back on volunteers only for such a deployment. The police units of the Länder should not be considered for assignements abroad.

All the Land police laws assume that the field of activity is identical with the respective Land territory.

The deployment of Federal border guard units outside of the Federal Republic of Germany raises tricky legal questions.

According to Article 87, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law the primary function of the Federal border guard is to protect the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Federal Border Guard Act specified this underyling norm more precisely and extended it by adding a number of additional tasks of a federal police force (above all, the protection of objects and persons).

There can be no objection to assignments with a police character to protect German goods and interests abroad with the approval of the government of the country concerned.

The Federal border guard, however, is not an instrument of the foreign policy activities of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Involvement in keeping the peace between armed conflicting parties also moves into a dimension with a military character.

It is fair to doubt, therefore, whether resorting to the Federal border guard will allow the — in reality non-existent — obstacle of Article 87a, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law to be negotiated.

Christian Tomuschat
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 4 August 1989)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Why both Hitler and Stalin had something to gain from pact

Fifty years ago Hitler and Stalin amazed the world by signing a pact. How could such arch-enemies possibly have joined forces? Michael Wolffsohn, professor of modern history at the Bundeswehr University, Munich, here explains why both dictators had extremely plausible motives.

One of the two devils, Stalin, is still alive, say thousands of demonstrators in the Soviet Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

They feel that only Hitler was exorcised in the Second World War, with the result that they have been left suffering the consequences.

They took to the streets to call for the 1938 Hitler-Stalin Pact to be declared null and void.

They particularly have in mind the secret provisions by which Hitler and Stalin agreed to share the three Baltic states, independent from 1918 to 1939, and Poland.

History is here patently the past that lives on into the present, and *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, or "coming to terms with the past," is part of day-to-day politics in countries other than Germany.

In common with others elsewhere, Soviet politicians long believed the best way to deal with the past was to deny it.

That was a mistake because to deny the explosive power of the past is to fuel the fires of day-to-day political disputes and to add further injustice to injustice of old.

Moscow has realised that this is the case and officially admitted, on 23 July 1989, for the first time, that the secret agreements existed. What was more, they were to be declared null and void.

The aim was clearly to soothe the heated tempers of people in the Baltic states. But that alone changes nothing, as Professor Dieter Blumenwitz aptly put it, writing in *Die Welt* on 31 July 1989.

Everyone is talking about the Hitler-Stalin Pact, but few realise that the pact was a parcel made up of three parts.

The first was the non-aggression pact the two dictators signed on 23 August 1939, having previously been considered "arch-enemies."

The second was secret provisions envisaging a share-out of the territorial spoils as follows:

- Germany was to be given a free hand in western and central Poland and Lithuania.
- Russia was to be given a free hand in eastern Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia.

Third, a German-Soviet frontier and friendship treaty was concluded on 28 September 1939 with another secret provision by which Lithuania was to be awarded to the Soviet Union while Lublin and parts of Warsaw were agreed to form part of the German sphere of interest.

Hitler took possession of his share of the spoils by invading Poland on 1 September 1939. He incorporated part of Poland in the Reich; these were areas where ethnic Germans were to settle and Poles were to be expelled.

The Poles were to be expelled to the territory known as the *Generalgouvernement*, the remainder of German-occupied Poland, where the Germans embarked on the physical annihilation of the Polish elite and the Jews.

On 17 September 1939 the Red Army marched into eastern Poland, which had already been occupied by the Wehrmacht.

Germans and Russians jointly celebrated the victory. Eastern Poland was incorporated in the Soviet Union in November 1939 and a separate Polish state ceased to exist.

200,000 Polish soldiers were treated by the Russians as common criminals, not as prisoners of war. In spring 1940 over 4,000 Polish officers were murdered near Katyn.

On 30 November 1939 Stalin invaded Finland. The Finns fought back but in March 1940 had to cede Carelia to the USSR.

In the final phase of the German campaign in the West, in mid-June 1940, Stalin annexed the Baltic states and took over Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Rumania.

Thousands of "enemies of the people" and "class enemies" were either deported or liquidated.

What prompted the two dictators to come to terms despite their evident mutual enmity?

"Everything I do is aimed against Russia," Hitler told an interlocutor five days before signing the pact with Stalin.

Five days after the pact had been signed he told a small group of people he would sign a pact with Satan to drive out the Devil.

Hitler had thus not changed his strategic objective, to destroy the Soviet Union. What he had changed was his tactics. He still planned to exterminate "Jewish Bolshevism" and "inferior races in the East."

If he was to wage war on the Soviet Union they must have a common frontier. One section existed in March 1939 after the destruction of what was left of Czechoslovakia.

DIE WELT

But this marshalling area was small and the hatred of the Russians felt by local people was not sufficiently to Hitler's liking.

He later enlisted the support of two other neighbours of Russia — Hungary and Rumania — as anti-Russian allies.

Small wonder. They shared ideological ties and had territorial claims. Rumania was keen to regain at least Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.

Poland too was intended to serve as what Sebastian Haffner calls a "scullion in carving up the Russian bear." Hitler offered the Polish government this role from autumn 1938 until March 1939.

Poland's land-mass was the largest single barrier between Germany and Russia. Poland was anti-Russian, semi-Fascist, anti-Semitic.

It had signed a 10-year non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1934, been awarded territory after the September 1938 Munich conference and was promised more still — part of the bountiful Ukraine — by Hitler.

Yet Warsaw refused to play ball. So Hitler decided to seize by force what he couldn't get by mutual agreement. The Polish goose, to quote Haffner again, was itself to serve as the first course. But the impending war in the East threatened to extend to the West. Britain, wooed by Hitler as a fellow-Germanic country, had been surprisingly uncompromising since the German occupation of rump Czechoslovakia. On 31 March 1939 it had guaranteed the continued existence of the Polish state and thereby made it clear to Hitler that this was as far as it was prepared to let matters go. Hitler had to forestall further clashes in the East. He couldn't assassinate Stalin, so he decided first to come to terms with him, prior to destroying first Poland, then Russia.



This is mine, that's yours. Berlin Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop signs 1939 pact. Moscow Foreign Minister Molotov (left) and Stalin are behind him. (Photo: Keystone)

France was to be defeated and Britain's nuisance value eliminated before his strategic attack on the Soviet Union, but as long as Germany was tied up to the west, it needed a secure and peaceful eastern flank

Unlike the First World War, Germany this time was not to run any risk of waging war on two fronts.

Germany badly needed raw materials for its campaign in the West. Russia supplied them. The later conquest of Russia would ensure long-term supplies, Hitler felt.

He was initially proved right. After victory in the West he turned his attention to the Soviet Union, invading Russia on 22 June 1941.

As for Stalin's reasons, the Soviet dictator needed to gain time. "Socialism in one country" — his own — was first to be secured.

He felt insecure and, above all, not yet strong enough to wage war on Germany. Besides, the pact with Hitler earned him spoils without costing much by way of commitments.

The Western powers, who were also keen to enlist Stalin's support, expected the Soviet Union to take part in an imminent war on Germany.

Yet they weren't even prepared to allow the Red Army the right to march through Poland.

Besides, why should the Soviet Union fight on the side of an imperialist country? Let the capitalists tear themselves to pieces!

If he sided with the West he could expect to wage soon a war on Germany in which there would be heavy losses. The pact with Hitler enabled him to ride roughshod over weak neighbouring states with impunity.

The Soviet Union stood to do nothing but gain and would then be able to cast its greater importance into the balance in world affairs.

Stalin never lost sight of this vision. Even after the German debacle at Stalingrad, between February 1943 and summer 1944, he regularly made peace approaches to Berlin.

The Soviet Union must no longer bleed; let the capitalists fight each other! That was why Stalin regularly backed the German card (and why he did so in his March 1952 note).

He wasn't only worried about his Western front in 1939. A major military conflict had threatened in the East since 1931 when Japan invaded China and came *uncomfortably close to the Soviet Union.*

Since May 1939 there had been furious fighting between the Soviet and Japanese armies on the border between Manchuria and Mongolia.

Stalin was only able to concentrate entirely on the East once he had signed his pact with Hitler in the West.

Japan suffered serious setbacks and had to sign a truce on 15 September 1939. Stalin was then able to send his troops west into Poland.

The Red Army invaded Poland on 17 September — thanks to the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

Many people felt at the time that the pact was a sensation, and certainly a shock. To this day many are unable to understood why the adversaries joined forces.

They fail to appreciate that the pact brought Hitler both foreign and domestic advantages.

The only domestic opposition to his regime that could be taken seriously, the old-style Prussian conservatives and the Wehrmacht generals, had persistently disapproved of the 1934 non-aggression pact with Poland and the alienation from Russia it entailed.

German right-wingers pleasurably recalled cooperation with Russia in the past. It had a long history, was almost invariably aimed at Poland and had been as successful as it was unscrupulous.

Poland was first partitioned in 1772, then in 1793 and finally in 1795. Tsarist Russia and Prussia put down Polish unrest on several occasions in the 19th century, jointly as a rule.

Had it not been for Imperial Germany, the Russian Revolution might not have happened (the Bolshevik October revolution, that is). The Germans smuggled Lenin into Russia in spring

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■ THE WORKFORCE

Unofficial all-European works council aims at coordinating strategy

Gisel isn't a male Giselle. It stands for Gillette Intersyndicale Européenne de Liaison, or European Inter-Union Gillette Liaison Group.

The group was set up by French, German and Spanish trade unionists to coordinate their works councils at factories operated by Gillette, the US razor blade manufacturer, all over Europe.

The immediate need to liaise was felt in connection with weekend work. For two years the company has tried to play off staff at its European works against each other on this issue.

In Berlin and Seville, for instance, some of the staff have lately had to work on Saturdays.

German and Spanish Gillette workers agreed to do so after protracted negotiations with the management. They accepted a compromise for fear of losing jobs to staff at the Gillette works in Annecy, France.

They then learnt that the management is planning to shut down the Annecy works entirely. "By working on Saturdays we are killing jobs there," says Manfred Foede of IG Metall, the German engineering union, in Berlin.

Staff representatives began to confer at European level and to exchange information. Since they set up Gisel early this year they have regularly briefed each other on problems pending at individual works.

In the event of industrial disputes they have undertaken to lend each other support. The only snag is that they have to take days off and pay their own travel expenses to attend Gisel meetings.

The Gillette workers have set up something that doesn't officially exist: an all-European works council.

IG Metall would now like to legalise groupings of this kind. "We envisage economic committees that could serve as a precursor of European works councils," says Bernhard Wurl of IG Metall's Frankfurt head office.

The European Commission, he says, submitted a preliminary draft for the statutes of a future European public limited company. "They envisaged a European works council too," he says.

The union takes a very dim view of this aspect being simply ignored in the present negotiations on the legal status of European companies in the internal market.



"We emphatically call on the European Commission and the newly-elected European Parliament," Wurl says, "to establish a legal basis for European works councils."

The unions are keen to stop national staff representation from being undermined by a Europeanisation of management, as IG Metall's general secretary, Franz Steinkühler, puts it.

He outlined this idea at an autumn 1988 conference on the future of the union. He sees European works councils as a counterweight to the "Europe of entrepreneurs" he fears may come about.

IG Metall is at present negotiating with three German companies — Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and Bosch — about setting up European economic committees as a pilot project.

These European works councils are either to be directly elected by staff at all company locations or to consist of members nominated by national works councils.

The union envisages them as being entitled to information — and to a say in management — on all issues that affect staff interests in more than one Western European country.

The economic committee would be entitled to raise objections to works closures or transfers and to the introduction of new working methods and production techniques.

Arrangements that might serve as a model already exist at two French firms, Thomson-Brandt and Bull.

Thomson-Brandt are a group manufacturing household equipment, with subsidiaries in several European countries.

Since October 1985 they have run a coordinating committee and an industry commission to review "structural and industrial changes and measures by which the company and staff can adapt to technological development."

In March 1988 Bull, an electronics manufacturer, agreed with the French engineering unions to set up a European information committee on which staff representatives from all countries with Bull subsidiaries serve.

These bodies have already achieved what the Gillette works councillors have yet to accomplish. Their work as European works councillors counts towards normal working hours, and travel expenses are paid by the employer.

Where European cooperation between staff representatives is concerned, IG Metall prefers to cite Thomson or Bull rather than Gillette.

The German union is uneasy about French Communist and Spanish anarcho-syndicalist members of Gisel, a liaison group set up independently of the trade union.

Officials at IG Metall's head office would prefer to liaise with unions that are geared to a relationship of social partnership with the management.

Trade unions differ widely within Europe in their political orientation. Workers' rights also vary substantially.

Yet Bernhard Wurl, whose brief at IG Metall's head office is works councils, does not feel this is an insuperable obstacle.

He says there are forms of industrial democracy in most European Community countries that are comparable with the German system.

The difference is merely in the form it takes, says Ernst Breit, general secretary of the DGB, Germany's Düsseldorf-based trades union confederation.

It is not, he says, an issue on which the world must necessarily follow in Germany's footsteps, but he would like to see the essentials of *Mitbestimmung*, the German system of management participation, standard in the single European market. If the German form of co-

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The Hitler-Stalin agreement

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1917. Wilhelm II was keen to ease the pressure on one or other of Germany's two fronts. Lenin promised and needed peace with Germany. Germany needed peace in the East to reinforce the Western front.

These ties were re-established during the Weimar Republic — at Rapallo in 1922. Literally overnight communist Russia and anti-communist Germany joined forces against the West.

In the years that followed, the Red Army and the black (i.e. illegally oversized) Reichswehr cooperated closely, gladly and well.

Conservative German officers and Soviet Communists established a partnership from which they both derived benefit. Hitler first used it in the summer of 1939.

He did so by hoisting his conservative Opposition by its own petard. It got what it wanted: cooperation with Russia against Poland. The German right wing set no great store by the democratic West.

Hitler and Stalin merely renewed old ties. Hitler trod in Wilhelm II's footsteps, Stalin in Lenin's.

The demarcation of spheres of interest did not end with the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact. In October 1944 Stalin and Churchill rewrote the map, again heedless of what most European nations wanted.

Declaring the pact null and void "changes nothing." Can it, then, be revised? Above all, can it be revised peacefully? Can the parcel be reopened?

Probably not, as that would more than just start a landslide. Political earthquakes would follow, including a complete redrawing of the political map of the world, not just the Baltic.

Ought the Soviet Baltic republics to be granted merely more autonomy or internal and external sovereignty? How is one to do so without granting the Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan and the many other Soviet nationalities similar concessions?

Sovereignty or mere self-government would spell the end of the gigantic Russian continental colonial empire, an empire conquered by the Tsars from the 15th century and by the Bolsheviks in our own.

It would mean the end of the Soviet Union as a multiracial state. Some might be jubilant about the idea. But have they considered the carnage that must then be expected?

We have seen a foretaste of it in the blood shed during clashes between nationalities in the Soviet Union in recent months.

That is partly why the Russian minority in the Baltic takes an alarming view of the future.

Must they now pay the price for Stalin's policy of yesteryear?

And why, if multiracial states are to break up, must only the Soviet Union do so? Why not states such as China, India, Pakistan or Yugoslavia, Turkey, Israel, Iraq or Iran, to name but a few?

Ought Finland not to be given back its 1939 borders? Or Rumania, for that matter.

And if the frontier between Rumania and the Soviet Union is to be called into question, then so must the border between Rumania and Hungary.

Why must the map be redrawn for the Baltic states and not for Poland? It forfeited its eastern territories in 1939 and was compensated in the West, at Germany's expense.

And if Poland's eastern border is to be reconsidered, then surely its western border, the Oder-Neisse Line, must be reconsidered too.

A partial revision is impossible, a total revision out of the question. You can't turn back the wheel of history. Chaos and bloodshed would ensue.

A revision need not mean a revision of frontiers. It can — and must — mean a revision of undemocratic systems.

And that could mean a democratisation of federations or confederations within their respective, present borders.

Maybe we are in the throes of this historic process of revolutionary change. That would be the optimistic option. There is a pessimistic one too, of course.

It consists of bloodshed and suppression of nationalities. Let us hope the optimistic option prevails.

Michael Wolffsohn
(Die Welt, Bonn, 4 August 1989)

■ AVIATION

Idea of Airbus production economies horrifies French

The consortium which builds Airbus is under increasing pressure to become commercially viable. American aircraft makers Boeing and McDonnell Douglas say the subsidies Airbus receives are unfair. Despite increasing sales, Airbus does not seem any nearer viability. One way to cut costs would be to bring various parts of the building operation together. At present, parts are built in France, Britain, Spain and Germany and flown around Europe in purpose-built transport aircraft called super Guppies. The Germans who have a 37.9 per cent stake in Airbus, the same as the French, say that at least 60 million dollars a year would be saved if a second assembly line were opened in Hamburg (the present one is in Toulouse, south France) so that the expensive transportation exercise could be reduced. British Aerospace, which is the British part of the consortium, agrees. The French don't like the idea at all. Hans-Dieter Hamboch goes behind the scenes for *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*.

Relations in the European Airbus consortium are strained. Icy silence and political pinpricks have predominated ever since the Germans made it known that they want to make more of the Airbus than what the French occasionally ridicule as "fuselages with toilets."

Politicians may deny there is anything wrong with relations between the partners, but insiders know better.

Jochen Eichen, head of public relations at Deutsche Airbus: "We hardly greet each other any more at conferences."

There has regularly been hard bargaining, and strained relations, as each new model since 1969 has reached the stage at which contracts have been awarded.

The prestige-conscious French, who tell customers all over the world that the Airbus is basically a French product, have always been reluctant to let the Germans, in this case MBB at Finkenwerder, Hamburg, do more than rivet together sections of the fuselage.

Once the Airbus is fully assembled in Toulouse, MBB is also entrusted with fitting it out to special customer requirements.

The late Franz Josef Strauss was a staunch supporter of plans to realign contract arrangements to ensure that Germany made more, and more important parts of the Airbus.

Germany held a 37.9-per-cent stake in the venture and this ought to be reflected in the contracts awarded to German companies.

He said shortly before his death: "If I pay the piper, I want to be able to call more of the tune."

MBB — Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm — agree. They are well aware of the prestige value of what is probably the best airliner now manufactured anywhere in the world.

The spate of order for the A 320 — 750 ordered, making the A 320 an unexpected moneyspinner in the Airbus range — has particularly galvanised MBB into activity.

The Munich-based aerospace group, with its Airbus construction division in Hamburg, was quick to act. After brief calculations Aérospatiale of France were sent figures showing that $60m a year could be saved if A 320 final assembly were to be transferred to the Federal Republic.

Substantial savings would result from making less frequent use of the super guppies, the jumbo transport aircraft that fly a complete Airbus fuselage from Hamburg to Toulouse four times a month.

Time and money could also be saved by shortening the time-span between assembly of expensive components, such as the engines, fitting-out and delivery to the customer.

The French say there is no need for any such realignment, and at present they are backed by Britain, for no readily apparent reason.

The Airbus consortium, an economic interest group — *groupement d'intérêt économique* — without paid-up capital, is said by the French to be best served by additions to the existing assembly line in Toulouse.

Off the record, Aérospatiale officials admit that the German figures are accurate, but the Germans, they say, could hardly have chosen a worse time to submit them.

MBB submitted its figures at the very moment the French arms group, Dassault, announced the closure of a factory in Toulouse.

Only 300 of the 1,500 workers to be made redundant could be found alternative jobs at Aérospatiale.

"Our timing could hardly have been more unfortunate," says a senior staff member of Deutsche Airbus, a wholly-owned MBB subsidiary.

But there are other reasons why the *grande nation* is so strongly opposed to parallel production of 132 A 320s a year in Hamburg. For one, the French have been unswerving supporters of the Airbus since its outset 20 years ago. Regardless who held power in the Elysée Palace, Paris has always been staunchly pro-Airbus.

Not so the Federal Republic, where there have been heated disputes over financing the five models, not to mention ideological opposition to the idea of manufacturing a European airliner in competition with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas of America.

The French have technical objections too. They claim — and frankly say so — that the Germans lack experience of non-military aircraft manufacture and lack system capability.

All they have to show for themselves is the short-haul Dornier Do 228, seating 19, which is a technological dwarf in comparison with, say, the A 340 Airbus.

Yet Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm are determined to renegotiate production arrangements in a manner more in keeping with the German stake in the project, especially now the Airbus is increasingly proving a moneyspinner.

MBB's supervisory board lined up DM380m in additional investment at the end of June with this aim in mind. DM200m will be available this year. That is exactly what it would cost to set up an initial German assembly line.

Bonn too sees light at the end of the tunnel of subsidies that have kept the Airbus project going. It also sees a last opportunity to restructure.

Bonn state secretary Erich Riedl, who is responsible for Airbus affairs, says: "Germany holds the same financial stake in the Airbus consortium as France. So it would be no more than fair to set up a second assembly line in Germany in recognition of this fact.

"Given the sales success of the Airbus, I feel our attitude on this point is particularly justifiable."

Unlike the French, he sees only financial considerations. An A 320 final assembly line in Germany, he says, "is, for us, not a matter of prestige but first and foremost a matter of profitability."

If the expected cost savings prove unrealistic, says the bustling Airbus lobbyist, Bonn will waive its demand.

It has no intention of paying a political price. There is no question of increasing the German stake in the consortium or of gaining in prestige, Herr Riedl says. "That is why, as I see, there can be no political price to pay. All aspects must be taken into consideration, the profitability of the entire range and the external representation of the German partner."

Bonn's modesty where high-tech prestige projects such as the Airbus or Ariane are concerned is felt by critics to cost German industry international prestige and lucrative orders, especially supply contracts.

Given the all-powerful international competition they acknowledge the compelling need to forge an all-European alliance but, as SPD Bundestag deputy Lothar Fischer recently put it in a Bonn debate: "Why must the French always do their own thing?"

A Franco-German commission of experts convened at short notice is now to consider how far European "community" extends when the chips are down.

The commission is expected to submit its findings in mid-September, Herr Riedl says. That seems most unlikely when French decision-makers will be on holiday until this deadline.

Hans-Dieter Hamboch
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 4 August 1989)

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operation with the management on a basis of partnership prevails over the more militant approach to worker representation adopted in France or Italy, companies should be able to come to terms with European works councils.

Fritz Himmelreich of the Confederation of German Employers' Associations is not, in any case, expecting agreement to be reached in Brussels in the foreseeable future on European economic committees as proposed by IG Metall.

As long as there are no guidelines valid all over Europe he has other problems entirely. German industrial associations are worried, as they have been for years, about the Federal Republic's future as an industrial location.

"When the discussion gets round, as it soon will, to where European companies that have merged are to have their head offices," he says, "the extent of industrial democracy in Germany must not lead to companies relocating in Belgium, France or Spain."

Thomas Gesterkamp
(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 4 August 1989)

■ TRANSPORT

Coming: a new generation of high-speed trains

German railways plan to run services twice as fast as by car and half the speed of aircraft within two years. New sections of track designed for speeds of up to 250kph (150mph) are already in use and the first Intercity Express (ICE) locomotives are due to leave the works this autumn. Krupp are assembling 28 of the 82 ordered but other firms are involved in the manufacturing process. Klaus Peter Kühn takes up the story for *Rheinishe Post*, the Düsseldorf daily.

Lok 1 is scribbled in chalk on the snub nose of the unfinished steelwork of the locomotive that is nearest completion at the Krupp works.

There are no signs of a mad rush. The steel shell has been given an undercoat the loco workers have fittingly dubbed "porky pink," but it doesn't yet even have axles. It is mounted on yellow steel stilts.

Music from a transistor radio can be heard in the driver's cab. That's as far as the electrics have progressed at what will be the workplace of a driver and co-driver at speeds of 250kph (150mph).

Two fitters are putting in the windscreen. It has to be fitted absolutely flush with the outer skin.

The twin-section glass fibre-reinforced plastic nose is fitted just as carefully. One gains a clearer initial idea of the streamlined elegant outlines of the Intercity Express.

The front of the locomotive will consist of an aerodynamically shaped nose and a roomy cab. The back looks as though it has been cleanly sliced off.

The carriages will later fit flush with the locomotive. A gap would cause air currents and reduce speed. So the locomotive and carriages are almost a single unit.

A sliding door opens with a clatter and the seven ICE locomotives are joined by an eighth.

It arrives on a Bundesbahn low-loader goods waggon, nudged through the door by a shunting locomotive.

It is covered in white tarpaulins with the Krauss Maffei logo. What, one wonders, are the Munich competition doing here?

This low-loader shipment is part of the sophisticated logistics needed now all three leading German locomotive manufacturers are working on the ICE project. The Bundesbahn has ordered 82 locomotives to power 41 trains. That isn't all that many.

In the good old days of steam a run of several thousand was far from uncommon.

But it is still a run, and to ensure the benefits of series production the three manufacturers have agreed on a division of labour.

Krauss Maffei are doing the bodywork, Thyssen-Henschel the wheels and axles, and Krupp the frames, using steel from Bochum or Rheinhausen.

Krupp, the Essen-based consortium leaders, are also making and fitting out the cabs and doing other interior work, mainly in weight-saving aluminium.

The three works are sharing final assembly. None wants to be done out of the spectacular sight of the star trains of the 1990s rolling out of its works sheds. And each is keen to be the first to finish a locomotive.

The Bundesbahn drove a hard bargain with the three loco works and the carriagemakers, who also joined forces to complete the contract.

Each supertrain, 400 metres long and consisting of two locomotives and twelve carriages, is to cost DM44m.

A trio of electrical engineering firms, ABB, AEG and Siemens, have joined forces to supply the electrics.

Their fitters are working at the loco works and they — their employers, that is — are grossing the lion's share of the DM8m each locomotive will cost.


The electrical components are the most expensive, from the electronics that makes it possible to use small but powerful three-phase current motors to the generator brake that feeds braking energy back into the overhead system.

These features have all proved their worth in the Intercity Experimental, built under Krupp supervision and commissioned in 1985.

But the final design will differ markedly from the prototype, with passenger-friendly carriages that are taller, wider and longer.

Passengers will also be able to choose between different carriage layouts, piped music via headphones, sunblinds and keypad telephones by their seat.

This comfort and the extra weight in comparison with the initial planning will result in higher energy consumption than originally estimated.



Supertrains. Each 150 mph train, consisting of 12 carriages and two engines, will be 400 metres long and cost 44 million marks. (Photo: ...)

This extra weight is due in part to special provisions to shield the carriage interior from high pressure when trains pass each other in tunnels.

The Bundesbahn says the running costs of its 41 ICE trains will be DM10m a year higher than expected — a DM10m higher electricity bill!

Yet the Intercity Express will still not use more power than a conventional Intercity train. Bundesbahn officials also dismiss rumours that the ICE will be too heavy to reach its projected speed of 250kph.

A conventional 12-carriage train powered by two standard electric locomotives was found to reach a top speed of 220kph, or 137mph. Clever-clogs engineers inferred that the ICE would fare no better.

They were comparing apples and pears, Bundesbahn officials say. The prototype and the ICE differ aerodynamically. "The ICE," the Bundesbahn insists, "will travel at 250kph — and faster."

The first ICEs are scheduled to hit the rails next spring, with all 41 being commissioned just over a year later.

Regular ICE services linking Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich and Hamburg, Würzburg and Munich are to run from 2 June 1991.

The ICE will travel at 250kph on a 327km (204-mile) section of track between Hanover and Würzburg and a 100km (62-mile) section between Mannheim and Stuttgart.

ICE locomotives will be more powerful than the prototype, with 6,500 as against 5,700 horse power each.

They will have larger cabs and two different current collectors (to enable ICE trains to run in Switzerland as well as Germany). They will lose their pristine porky pink colouring once they are in the painting sheds, which they will leave snow white and 600kg (1,320lb) heavier.

That is enough paint to spray 250 cars. It will be joined by a few kilograms of ruby red and a dash of pink; the ICE's livery will include a two-tone nose-to-tail stripe.

Another distinctive feature will be the ICE logo, 1.28m (4ft 2in) tall, on both sides of the locomotive.

Locomotives make up a mere fraction of the turnover of Krupp Maschinentechnik, but they can always be sure of the limelight.

The 2,500 Krupp workers in Essen make all manner of useful items, ranging from canning machines that handle 1,200 cans a minute to jumbo presses that press pots, pans and car fenders.

The Krupp workshed is the size of 12 football pitches; the locomotives are made in an area the size of one and a half football pitches.

On the half-pitch, as it were, sparks are flying. Sectional steel is here being welded into shape to make up the frameworks for the next set of locomotives.


Krupp have made and exported locomotives for 70 years, with customers in countries ranging from Burma to Zaire.

But German express locomotives have always stolen the show. They included the world's first turbine-powered steam locomotive in 1924.

They included the Bundesbahn's last steam locomotive series, designed and built in Essen in the 1950s. Now, 30 years later, the ICE locomotives are keeping up the tradition.

Klaus Peter Kühn

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 5 August 1989)



■ THE MEDIA

Colossal, megalossal, megamegalossal

Size seems to be the important factor in the media industry. Acquisitions spread the empires across all sorts of communications: books, magazines, music, videos, television, films. Germany's Bertelsmann has foraged around outside Germany and built itself up into the biggest media company in the world. Late last month, Time bought Warner and created Time Warner, leaving Paramount and its hostile bid for Time out in the cold and relegating Bertelsmann to second place in the media league. But *Bertelsmann*, whose tradition goes back into the 19th century, has not stopped expanding and its cash situation is, unlike some of its competitors, good. Dieter Fuchs reports for the Hamburg weekly, *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt.*

What have the German *Nachrichten-Magazin* published in Hamburg and the book club Circulo do Livero, in Sao Paulo, in common? What have the Bonn-based *Informationsdienst* and the Los Angeles-based Riverside County Publishing Company in common?

Nothing at all. Apart from the fact that all are partly or entirely owned by Bertelsmann, the Gütersloh, Westphalian, publisher.

It was from here that Bertelsmann, founded in 1835, began two years after the war on the climb which would make it into the biggest media concern in the world. In 1987-88, it had 336 subsidiaries, almost 42,000 employees and a world-wide turnover of 11.3 billion marks. Those, apparently, were the dimensions of the biggest fish in the sea.

Apparently. But not quite. Without warning, Bertelsmann suddenly became number two. The merger between Time and Warner saw to that.

But Bertelsmann has not reached its growth limits. In has continually grown in the past, especially over the past decade; and it has the wherewithal to grow in the future. Its headquarters has stayed where it has been since, in 1835, Carl Bertelsmann founded it: in Gütersloh. Tradition carries obligations.

For more than a 100 years, Bertelsmann, operating from this solicitous corner of Germany, produced uplifting publications for an upmarket public. Religious books, philosophical works, thoughtful books, in volumes thick and volumes thin. There was also a bookclub but it was a genteel operation in comparison with the giant that exists today.

The change of character happened suddenly, in 1947. The upward turn in search of world peaks to conquer was the result of two major factors.

One was a huge list of customers with which to open up new markets; and the other was the return of Reinhard Mohn, a descendant of Carl Bertelsmann, from a prisoner-of-war camp in Kansas.

Mohn says today that the future of the company was influenced far more by America than any other factor.

Bertelsmann book clubs spread rapidly across the length and breadth of Germany and then across the border. Now they have reached 22 countries and have 22 million members.

Book clubs in this age of the electronic media are no longer a growth area. Mohn wanted growth. So he bought into other book publishers, he bought into newspaper publishers, he bought into printing works and he bought into record- and film companies all over the world.

The enormous buying power of a book-buying public that bought consistently through the book clubs meant that the firm was never short of cash to finance expansion. Growth was so rapid that it soon was pushing at its multimedia limits inside Germany.

So the same policy was pursued outside Germany. Now, more than two thirds of its turnover comes from other countries. The statistics show the strength of the foreign business: in books, records and radio cassettes, 78.8 per cent of the business is in outside Germany.

In the electronic media, films and television, outside-Germany business is much smaller — a mere 40.2 per cent of all Bertelsmann business in that field. But Bertelsmann can stand it - it comprises a tiny 1.5 per cent of total turnover.

The monster earner is music and video. In this field, 81.8 per cent of Bertelsmann's turnover (a total of 2.112 billion marks) comes from outside Germany. It is also the fastest growing area — in 1987-88, it grew by 81.6 per cent, mainly through the Bertelsmann Music Group (headquarters in New York) buying up RCA.

That acquisition at a stroke put music and video in the vanguard of company's operations, up there with the book- and record club section and the huge magazine firm of Gruner + Jahr. Bertelsmann has 74.9 per cent of Hamburg-based Gruner + Jahr with the minority holding remaining in the hands of the Jahr founding family.

The flagship of Gruner + Jahr is the weekly magazine *Stern* which has weekly sales of 1.35 million. The women's magazine, *Brigitte*, has a circulation of 1.064 million copies. More specialised magazines such as *art*, *PM Computerheft* and *Häuser* have circulations of around 70,000.

All Gruner + Jahr publications are strong on advertising. In money terms, more than half the publisher's turnover



is outside Germany. *Parents* in America, *Femme actuelle* and *Prima* in France now have bigger circulations than *Stern*.

Through Gruner + Jahr, Bertelsmann has interests in both (the German weekly news magazine) *Der Spiegel* and its stable publication, *Manager Magazin* with 24.75 per cent and 24.9 per cent respectively.

Gruner + Jahr for a long time was Bertelsmann's biggest profit maker. It has acquired the Hamburg daily tabloid, *Hamburger Morgenpost*.

Since 1981, Mohn has ruled Bertelsmann from the background — as head of the advisory board (as opposed to the management board, which is in charge of day-to-day affairs). But that does not mean his grip is any less firm.

One who found that out was Mohn's successor as head of the group, Manfred Fischer, a former head of Gruner + Jahr's management board. Mohn quickly sacked him. Possibly Fischer made the mistake of thinking he was the only chief in the group. Mark Wössner, who succeeded Fischer, has avoided the

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Springer fights rearguard action against dogged foe

Peter Tamm, chairman of the managing board of the Axel Springer publishing house, is a man of resolution.

"I do not want war," he told the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, "but we may have no alternative."

All the newspapers published by Springer, from *Bild* to *Die Welt*, had previously made it clear who the adressee of this declaration of war is: the enemy is in Munich and his name is Leo Kirch.

Two editors-in-chief of the yellow press daily *Bild* wrote a 46-line commentary to tell readers just what a nasty guy the Munich film dealer Kirch really is.

Another Springer daily, the *Hamburger Abendblatt*, accused Kirch of "blackmail" and warned: "Leo Kirch wants power and money."

This assessment of the intentions of the powerful film dealer is not mistaken.

Kirch has never made a secret about the fact that he wants both power and money.

It became clear just how doggedly he intends fighting to achieve his goals, even in a seemingly hopeless position, during the general meeting of the Springer group in July.

Kirch, who holds 10 per cent of the Springer shares and claims to control another 16 per cent through trustees, has for years been demanding — in vain — to be given two seats on the supervisory board.

Springer has also insistently refused the registration of the 16 per cent of these fiduciary shares in the share register under the name of Kirch in order to prevent Kirch from obtaining a blocking minority.

This is quite above board, since Springer shares have a restricted transferability and the transfer is subject to the consent of the board of management and the supervisory board.

Kirch's representatives at the meeting made it clear that they no are no longer willing to accept this refusal without a fight.

The small shareholders contentedly listened to the one-hour report by the chairman of the managing board Tamm (Tamm: "The Axel Springer publishing house is a healthy, creative, expansive and future-orientated enterprise.") and welcomed the news of a dividend of DM12.50.

Many of them were already on their way to lunch when the lawyer Alfred Stiefenhofer from Munich asked to speak on behalf of his client Leo Kirch. The peaceful atmosphere suddenly changed.

Stiefenhofer took the bull by the horns and claimed that Springer's performance was not as good as it may seem on paper.

He cleverly demonstrated the possibilities the film dealer nevertheless has to impose his will upon the managing and supervisory boards.

Following a motion by Stiefenhofer the general meeting agreed by a large majority to a special audit on Springer's activities in Spain and Austria. Stiefenhofer had questioned the economic viability of these activities.

Stiefenhofer also insisted that the buying of shares by the Springer company in the Italian publishing group Monti in June this year should be subjected to a special audit.

This would answer the question whether the company paid a price which was five times too high for its stake in Monti.

The shareholders at the general meeting soon realised what the lawyer was trying to do.

He was indirectly accusing the managing and supervisory boards of having made a disguised distribution of profits in favour of the Springer heirs.

The Monti group for its part had bought ten per cent of Springer shares — with a substantial mark-up in terms of the stock market price at the time.

A special audit in this case was rejected for technical reasons, since it did not relate to the business year 1988.

Both the managing board and the supervisory board protested strongly against the insinuation.

One thing, however, is certain: if Leo Kirch wants to get tongues wagging about Springer he will finds ways and means.

The Hamburg-based Springer house was prepared for the frontal attack.

An attempt by both sides to reach agreement was already unsuccessful on 7 July. Both sides accused each other of a lack of willingness to compromise.

Just as Kirch insists on more influence on Springer, Tamm wants more power in the private broadcasting station SAT 1.

Kirch directly and indirectly controls 40 per cent of the shares in SAT 1, whereas Springer has to make do with 27 per cent.

The result is that all decisions taken in SAT 1 are subject to the approval of the Leo Kirch "faction."

Following years of a clever personnel policy almost all key positions in the TV station are held by Kirch supporters, who comply with the wishes expressed in Munich even without formal directives.

The desire of the Springer publishers for a bigger slice of the TV cake is not only based on media policy considerations, but also on economic interests.

Up to now SAT 1 has been a loss-making project for Springer.

Although Kirch has also had to finance losses in his shareholding capacity he is probably on the whole making a pretty good profit.

Since SAT 1 began transmissions Kirch has been its main supplier of feature films and TV series, which account for the lion's share of the SAT 1 programme.

Thanks to his position Kirch can siphon off profits by increasing the prices of his films before the profits are distributed to the other shareholders.

Kirch has made it clear to Tamm that he intends tapping this almost no-risk source of income to the full in future.

According to Springer information, Kirch has asked for DM700m for 1,500 films and 1,000 series hours.

During the Springer general meeting Tamm complained that Kirch is trying to "shed his debts" at the expense of the Springer shareholders.

Kirch bought his dominant position on the film market with the help of considerable loans from banks.

Kirch's press spokeswoman, Armgard von Burgsdorff, described Tamm's version of the situation as "grossly misrepresentative."

She stated that Kirch offered the Springer group half of his SAT 1 shares

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■ THE ARTS

Plenty of sponsors, but altruism is a disappearing quality

Solo dancer — target group: intellectuals in all age-groups, especially audiences younger than forty; image dimensions: aesthetics, progress, originality."

This is the wording of a "profile" of a Latin American dancing wonder, whose skills are praised in a circular put out by a Berlin sponsoring agency.

The addressees of the *Time Code* agency are firms interested in polishing up their corporate image by sponsoring cultural projects.

The agency views itself as an "independent and qualified mediator" between culture and industry.

This new variant of marketing consultancy reflects a trend towards private support for cultural events, "cultural sponsoring."

In the USA private industry has always financed the not always only fine arts; public funds only account for roughly ten per cent of the total figure.

The situation is, or at least has been up to now, different in the Federal Republic of Germany, where the promotion of culture is a matter for central, regional and local government.

As Michael Schöneich from the Standing Conference of German Municipal Authorities explained, however, local governments accounted for over half of the approximately DM8.5m spent on culture by the Federal, Land and local governments in 1988.

Last year German industry only invested about DM250m in the promotion of cultural activities.

Nevertheless, non-governmental support for the arts does have a long tradition in Germany.

Private donors and foundations have been part of the cultural landscape for many years.

Names such as Kurt A. Körber and Alfred C. Toepfer represent the classic type of the patron of the arts: the selfless patron who awards prizes and grants without thinking about the immediate benefit for his own person or for his company.

This kind of altruistic sponsor, however, who likes to do good without talking about it publicly, is increasingly becoming a rarity.

At a time when industrial products seem more and more alike companies look for new ways of promoting a distinctive product image.

Many businesses have discovered culture as a marketing instrument; *l'art pour l'art* — the idea of art as an end in itself, which was publicly formulated for the first time by the French philosopher Victor Cousin in 1818 — appears to be hopelessly outdated.

According to a study by the Munich-based Ifo Institute about 40 per cent of all German firms currently sponsor cultural events.

The most frequent motive is the cultivation of the corporate image, closely followed by the aspect of canvassing customers.

At the Lufthansa airline company cultural sponsoring is primarily intended as a means of employee motivation.

The company is convinced that "an internal dialogue is the prerequisite for successful job involvement."

This philosophy is not always popular.

Last year, for example, Jürgen Flimm and the Thalia theatre in Hamburg turned down sponsoring funds offered by the MBB arms manufacturing group.

A majority in the theatre's management and in the ensemble felt that the association of this company with arms production is incompatible with the theatre's moral standards.

Some actors feared that the theatre would become dependent on the sponsoring company and were reputed to have been willing to do without their fees if the decision had gone the other way.

Bogomir Ecker, an artist who lives in Düsseldorf, has very much the same fears and announces: "I sponsor myself."

Although the sculptor has nothing against classic patronage he has no intention of becoming a walking advertising column.

"The names of the artists become smaller and smaller, the names of the firms bigger and bigger," he claims.

In the sports branch — whether in football, tennis or skiing — stadium advertising and company names or logos on sports clothing is common practice.

Michael Schöneich warns against a similar development in the arts. In his opinion "the freedom of the sports has long since been lost."

Annelie Pohlen, the secretary of the Bonn Arts Association, is also sceptical.

Collaboration with a local firm fell through at an early stage.

"Most firms are still a bit wary of up-and-coming art," Frau Pohlen complains.

Cultural sponsoring would only seem to work in fields where the artists or the cultural category are firmly established;



newcomers and artists who are not so well known have greater difficulty finding sponsors.

This touches on a sore point, the weak point in the relationship between art and commercial interests.

Many critics complain that companies only sponsor representative and spectacular activities, in particular operas, concerts and big exhibitions.

American Express sponsored the "Europa-Amerika" exhibition in Cologne, Olivetti the exhibition "Das Glas der Cäsaren", and Philips the Bonn opera house.

There are numerous other examples ranging from the Schleswig-Holstein music festival to Bavaria's Prinzregententheater.

Most of the sponsored cultural events attract attention and draw in the crowds, thus easily fulfilling the requirements which Uli Kostenbader, who is responsible for cultural sponsoring in the Daimler-Benz company, formulates as follows: "We want to reward achievement."

The Stuttgart-based group, which describes itself as a "patron of quality", provides funds for cultural institutions and events of regional, national and international repute, such as the Württemberg state theatre or the German Youth Orchestra. "If your name is Meier or Schulte it is naturally more difficult to find a sponsor," says the director of the Bavarian state theatre, August Everding, "than if your name is Virgil or Horace." (Virgil and Horace were generously patronised by Maecenas, a close friend and adviser to Emperor Augustus. The "father of all patrons of the arts", however, did not act all that unselfishly. As the emperor's senior head of police Gaius Cilnius Maecenas was able to censor literature and make sure that it conformed with the emperor's policies.)



Sponsorship is a controversial area. Ford sponsored this marble Ford car by H. A. Schult in Cologne. (Photo: Ford)

Everding is worried that the cultural involvement of industry could, in the long term, encourage local governments to withdraw from cultural financing and send directors and theatre-managers in search of sponsors.

Dieter Sauberzweig, head of the German Institute of Urban Studies in Berlin, feels that this is a particular danger in the poorer districts:

"The heads of the cultural departments of the local authorities would then be obliged to an increasing extent to raise the money themselves."

Financial backing by industry is rarely given on a long-term basis, but tends to be tied to specific projects.

Consequently, there is little or no scope for any saving for a rainy day.

What happens, however, when industry is hit by a difficult period and the money stops rolling in?

Only long-term public financing ensures the survival of the "culture industry". Sponsors are only good for an additional injection of fresh funds.

Martin Neuffer from the Private Initiative for Art emphasises that private money is mainly allocated "for representative purposes."

Male-voice choirs and provincial theatres, therefore, are still reliant on regular financial support from the local authorities.

Museums are also unable to manage with sponsorship funds alone, even when the economy is doing well.

Alheidis von Rohr from the Historisches Museum in Hanover complains that sponsors finance exhibitions but rarely contribute towards maintenance costs.

"No-one pays for the personnel," she says.

She would like to see sponsors also pay for stockrooms, restorations or social benefits.

During this year's congress of the German Museum Association in Frankfurt Allheidis von Rohr said that the terms of lending out loan objects should be examined closely.

As a rule, museums have to pay for the insurance and restorations of the items themselves.

More sponsorship funds should be made available for ethnology and natural history. The problem is that there is little response in the press.

Annelie Pohlen also takes the opinion that the media have trouble developing a positive attitude to sponsored events.

She complains that the press probably has to run a report on the major cultural events, but that *feuilletons* often ignore the smaller and lesser known activities.

Yet there are examples to the contrary. Unusual partnerships between art and capital, created by the willingness to engage in discussion and the courage to accept what is new and not yet established.

Some firms, for example, such as the Hamburg holding company Batig or the perfume company 4711 in Cologne, have set themselves the task of supporting young and by and large unknown artists.

The latter concentrates on sponsoring the latest art trends.

Since 1980 it has awarded the "Glockengasse" prize to artists "who move beyond commonly accepted ideas by means of their new form of expression."

In the salesroom of this particular company, which wishes to be regarded as a patron, works of artists are displayed which "cannot be found in any gallery."

The Lufthansa airline has also opted for a difficult mode of sponsorship.

Apart from its financial support for prestige objects such as the "Theater der Welt" in Hamburg, the "Refigured Painting" exhibition in Düsseldorf or the "Kulturtage Ruhr" in New York City Lufthansa is also showing a growing interest in the sponsorship of young art.

Friedrich Loock, the man who recently took over responsibility in the Lufthansa company for its cultural activities announced that the company would in future be supporting "projects with less public appeal."

Cultural sponsorship in the Federal Republic of Germany is still in its infancy.

It is uncertain who will gain the upper band in the long run; the government, art or industry. Experiences in other

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■ EDUCATION

Erasmus brings tertiary studies out of the shadow of provincial fustiness

What connection is there between the town of Passau in Lower Bavaria and the humanist Erasmus from Rotterdam?

At first glance none at all, especially since Passau did not even have a university during the scholar's lifetime (he died in 1536).

Today, just over 6,000 students use the converted Saint Anne monastery buildings on the campus. Passau University has tried right from the start to rid itself of the reputation of provincial fustiness traditionally associated with Lower Bavarian universities.

In the true spirit of the Dutch cosmo*politan* Erasmus, the university directorship encourages its students to spend at least a longer period of time in a neighbouring European Community country.

Since June 1987 the European Community has been financing and fostering the mobility of academics within the framework of its ambitious inter-university exchange and cooperation programme.

It is no coincidence that the education experts in Brussels called their programme Erasmus.

The abbreviation for "European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of Students" represented the starting signal for an attempt to break out of the ivory tower of academia.

The idea took up the tradition of studying abroad which Erasmus helped establish in the 16th century.

Quite a few West German universities were initially sceptical about the new programme.

After all, it was more convenient to support students who wanted to risk a glance over the fence on their initiative.

Not so the university of Passau. It grasped the opportunity of sending, say, students of the specialist subject "Mediterranean culture" to the countries they are studying.

Passau is currently involved in 18 Erasmus programmes in close collaboration with universities in five Community member states. It is the leading German university in this respect.

By way of comparison, the larger university in Munich was not involved in a single programme in 1988/1989.

Last year 82 students from Passau enrolled in universities in Portugal, Spain, France, Britain and the Netherlands. At the moment 56 foreign students are studying at Passau.

According to the head of Academic Exchange Office at Passau University, Herbert Bockel, a growing number of students are applying for financial support for their stays abroad from the Erasmus scheme.

The programme enables up-and-coming lawyers, for example, to stay for a longer period at the Catholic university of Oporto or students of economics and technical subjects to extend their horizons in Lisbon.

If their application for financial support is accepted the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) in Bonn provides students with a grant, which is topped up by Erasmus funds.

However, before the students pack their bags they have to undergo a period of subject-specific preparation.

During the first semester regionally orientated seminars and language

Frankfurter Rundschau

courses are offered. Lecturers at Passau University have also shown a keen interest into the exchange programme.

During their stay in partner countries they have the opportunity to familiarise themselves with other university systems and incorporate their experiences in their own curriculae.

The declared objective of the "integrational programme", which began in 1987 with a budget of 92.5m Ecu (one Ecu is worth roughly DM2), is the gradual harmonisation of study courses in the European Community.

There are still considerable differences between the various national systems.

The aim is to replace the latter by "integrated transnational programmes."

A supportive measure is the directive issued by Community's Council of Ministers last year requesting all member states to recognise degrees and study certificates obtained abroad without reservation on a Community-wide basis.

The officials in charge of the Erasmus scheme are currently extending the list of study courses which have yet to be mutually recognised.

During the past two years a total of 20,000 students took part in study courses in European Community countries financed by Erasmus scheme funds. The office responsible has already promised 6,500 grants for the 1988/89 period.

Most applications were made by language students, followed by students of the subjects engineering sciences, business management and social sciences.

A thousand cooperation programmes between Community universities were accepted.

Officials are already having trouble coping with the deluge of applications.

As there is only likely to be a marginal increase in the budget funds for the scheme during the next few years (current level: 192m Ecu) more and more applications will have to be rejected.

The Erasmus objective formulated by the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, of financing a period abroad for at least ten per cent of all students in the European Community by 1992 thus seems unrealistic.

One in three applications is already being rejected. This could be accompanied by a continuing decrease in the average grant figure, which currently amounts to an annual maximum of 5,000 Ecu per student.

More and more students are complaining that their grants were far too low. In some countries — including France and Italy — they claim that up to two thirds of their grant money was needed to pay for accommodation.

Other exchange students say that it is virtually impossible to find a place to stay during shorter periods abroad.

In many cases these students are forced to keep their rooms or flats in their native countries.

Some students complain that the preparatory language courses in their home universities were inadequate and that they were unable to follow lectures given in the language of their host countries.

Albert Raasch from the university of Saarbrücken confirmed that the universities in the Federal Republic of Germany offer too few courses.

Raasch, who conducted a survey on this aspect, also misses an independent teaching approach in language teaching.

In some Community countries there has been a proper run on the Erasmus programme.

The Euro-enthusiasm of West German students, however, is on the wane. The share of West German application in the total number of applications fell this year for the first time since 1987.

"For the German students, who were once able to gather experience abroad with the help of the DAAD foriegn grants, the lure of the new has disappeared," Gisela Baumgratz from the German Research Institute in Paris explains.

"The role of trailblazer in European awareness has in the meantime been taken on by France."

Students from countries such as Spain and Portugal have also, in terms of the number of applications made, become markedly "Europe-motivated." Frau Baumgratz feels that the Erasmus programme was a tremendous "ray of hope" for these countries "to break out of the encrustation of the university system in their native countries."

The sacred European Community principle of allocating maximum quotas to each member state when in comes to distributing funds, has been the subject of growing criticism during recent months.

As this quota can on no account be exceeded a growing number of British and Irish students will have to be rejected in the near future because the number of applications in these two countries is particularly high.

In Italy, on the other hand, the ratio is two Erasmus grants to one applicant student due to the comparative lack of interest in this member state.

Denmark and, above all, Greece have also shown little interest in the programme up to now.

The "harmonious distribution of subjects" laid down in the programme, however, has — with the exception of medicine and educational theory — worked out well.

Countries which do not belong to the European Community, such as Switzerland and Austria, are also interested in participation in the exchange and cooperation programme.

Keeping pace

They have undoubtedly realised that they must try to keep pace with developments in this field with an eye to the European internal market after 1992.

During recent years Professor Ulrich Teichler from Kassel, head of the Scientific Head Office for Vocational and University Research, has taken a closer look at the job prospects of exchange students.

His study findings indicate that the a stay abroad has helped the overwhelming majority of exchange students get off to a better start to their careers.

Although this may not be reflected in a better salary right from the start these students were able to profitably introduce an international dimension to their work at a later stage.

In a "citizens' Europe", says Teichler, the Erasmus programme has proved to be a milestone.

Thomas Veser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 August 1989)

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countries suggest a measured degree of caution.

Dieter Sauberzweig points to Italy, where the gaps in the government budget were by and large filled with the help of sponsorship money.

Although (chemical) firms were able to improve their image "their policy has not changed and the solution to environmental problems simply deferred."

Nevertheless, says Sauberzweig, prejudices should not prevent dialogue: "A discussion should always be possible."

Collaboration of a special kind is taking place in Cologne.

The managing director of the Cologne museums, Hugo Borger, who would probably drive round in an ice-cream van to collect money for his museums, and the head of the city's cultural department, Peter Nestler, have been systematically applying a mixed financing model popular in the USA since the beginning of the year: "matching funds."

Private and public funds, provided interdependently in line with the motto "If you give me a mark I'll give you one", enable the realisation of specific projects.

The idea requires entrepreneurial intuition.

The Ford motor company has contributed a substantial amount of money to the new Museum of Applied Art and is given in return the opportunity to boost its image during the exhibition "Bewegte Zeiten."

This form of mixed financing is also being practised at a federal level.

In its project "Bildung und Kultur" the Bonn Education Ministry is reputed to be extremely satisfied with the matching funds system.

The Baden-Württemberg art foundation had been financing its activities for many years along similar lines.

Another example can be found in Bavaria. Together with the city of Munich the BMW motor company has been sponsoring the "Spielmotor" association, which sustains cultural activities in the Alabama Hall.

This means of obtaining funds has advantages for all parties concerned.

This at any rate is the opinion marketing expert Peter Roth takes in his book *Kultursponsoring*.

Mixed financing gives local governments the possibility to plan longer-term projects.

The participation of public institutions increases the reputation of the project sponsored and thus benefits the company.

Can the matching funds model prevent a one-sided sponsorship of spectacular events?

"This system may not be so bad," says a smiling August Everding. "It forces the state to take part in activities it would never have otherwise considered.

Jutta Falke

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 4 August 1989)

■ MEDICINE

Explosion of knowledge about how body's immune system works

Just how does the body's immune system, its defences against germs and foreign bodies, distinguish between its own, healthy cells and the properties of malign and alien cells?

How does the immune system identify substances it has not previously come across as intruders?

And how do the body's defences succeed in attacking and destroying undesirable substances while, as a general rule, sparing its own?

These are questions considered by immunology, the study of immune systems, a discipline dating back a century to when Berlin chemist Paul Ehrlich discovered substances in the blood he called antibodies.

We owe to immunology an abundance of vaccines, effective treatments for complaints of all kinds and the high survival rate of transplanted organs.

Yet immunology has only recently, with the aid of molecular biology and genetic engineering, succeeded in answering some of the fundamental questions posed by the immune system and how it works.

Research findings are now following each other in swift succession. There has been an explosion of scientific knowledge. It was partly reflected at the Seventh International Immunology Congress, held at the International Congress Centre in Berlin.

The congress, attended by over 7,000 specialists from 65 countries, included over 3,500 lectures and workshops.

Arguably the most striking feature of the immune system is that, like the brain, it is capable of learning until a late age, say about 50.

It does so in two ways, Professors Peter Krammer of the Heidelberg cancer research centre and Harald von Boehmer of the Basle immunology institute told the congress.

One way is via the thymus, a ductless gland near the root of the neck. In it, defender cells from the bone marrow, lymphocytes or white blood corpuscles, are taught to distinguish between their own and alien cell properties, so-called antigens.

The thymus itself owes this information from feedback by defender cells to their "training centre."

All cells and substances that occur in the child's body are regarded as its own; others that find their way into the body later or are otherwise produced are classified as alien and in need of being eliminated.

The thymus makes provision, in accordance with this feedback, to ensure that only defender cells designed to attack foreign bodies or substances are sent out into the blood.

Lymphocytes in the thymus that succeed, as antibodies, in developing the characteristics of an antigen designed to attack the body's own cells are destroyed and not allowed to find their way into other parts of the body.

Exceptions occur when the balance of the body's immune system is disturbed. Thymus checks evidently fail to function, with the result that defender cells attack organs and cells that are the body's own.

This process, Professor Hugh McDevitt of Stanford, California, told the congress, seems to be triggered in cases of juvenile diabetes.



The second way in which the immune system learns as it goes along is connected with the shape that immune cells take in order to fight antigens.

There are billions of antigens in us and in our surroundings. They can only be kept at bay if an antibody fits the antigen like a key fits a lock.

The composition of defender cells is, like that of all body substances, controlled by genetic material.

So immunologists assumed there must be billions of genes to counteract all the antigens they encounter in the course of a lifetime.

Suzumu Tonegawa, one of five Nobel laureates who attended the Berlin congress, discovered in the mid-1970s that defender cells were based on a mere three different genetic repertoires.

This is perhaps best understood as though the end-products consisted of parts taken from three building block kits.

In this way, by combining a mere handful of genes, the immune system is able to devise a virtually unlimited number of permutations.

In respect of this kind of genetic learning the immune system enjoys a special status among biological systems, said Professor David Baltimore of Boston, Massachusetts.

Nowhere else are genes capable of rearranging themselves as required in later life.

A better understanding of the ways in which the immune system learns its lessons opens up opportunities of devising practical, medical uses, many of which were dealt with at the Berlin congress.

They related to infectious diseases, cancer, auto-aggressive ailments, allergies, rheumatic inflammation and immune complaints of all kinds, including both congenital and acquired conditions (such as Aids).

No forecasts were made in Berlin as to when a vaccine might be developed to deal with HIV, the Aids virus. But the congress was briefed on a project that has come up with a favourable answer on an important preliminary aspect.

It is whether and, if so, how a patient whose immune system is weakened can be helped by vaccination.

Research scientists led by Professor Bernard Moss of Bethesda, Maryland, vaccinated laboratory mice with weakened immune systems.

They were given a dose of vaccinia, a virus that used to be used for smallpox jabs. It is a virus to which cell material can be added by means of genetic engineering.

The admixtures could, for instance, be the Aids virus or its antigens. A vaccine for treating HIV might be developed as a result.

Professor Moss and his associates first carried out experiments in which immune-stimulating substances were grafted on to the vaccine virus. To their surprise the mice were soon capable of immune responses again.

In human terms this treatment might succeed in preventing any further increase in the number of HIV germs in the weakened body of an Aids patient.

In Heidelberg Professor Stefan Meuer and his associates have sought in much the same way a means of protecting kidney patients who have to undergo regular dialysis from infection in general and hepatitis B in particular.

Kidney patients generally have weakened immune systems, so they are particularly susceptible to infectious hepatitis and the further risk of cirrhosis and cancer of the liver.

Since vaccination presupposes an intact immune system, only about 50 per cent of kidney patients can be helped in this way.

In order to protect the other 50 per cent, Professor Meuer told the congress, they were given a dose of interleukin, an immune response "messenger" substance, before being vaccinated against hepatitis.

Eight out of 10 patients then developed antibodies against hepatitis. Only one out of eight other patients who were not given this prior treatment showed signs of antibodies after vaccination.

Another technique outlined in Berlin is most ingenious in making use of the thymus's learning potential to prevent transplant rejection.

Professor Boehmer said it avoided the disadvantages of the drugs currently used to suppress immune response and rejection of a transplanted organ.

Drugs block not only antibodies aimed at the transplanted organ. They also sideline defender cells against other alien substances such as germs or allergens.

As a result, transplant patients are susceptible — and exposed almost without protection — to a plethora of ailments.

Deliberate manipulation in respect of the antibodies concerned is said now to make this risk unnecessary.

The body activates its defences against the transplant after every operation of this kind. Defender cells in the thymus are notified that something is there that wasn't there before — and must thus be alien.

The latest experiments involve filtering out of the blood all antibodies designed to attack the intruder, in this case the transplant.

There is then no defender cell left in the body that has been briefed on the presence of the transplant, and the thymus is unable to breed fresh antibodies to fight it.

It too can only learn from reports received from immune cells that something alien has intruded.

Once all the transplant antibodies have been eliminated, the immune system accepts the alien organ as its own and no longer rejects it.

Dieter Dietrich

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 4 August 1989)

Information key to transplant success

Facts and figures are of crucial importance for the success of organ transplants, which is why an European information network has been mooted.

A wide range of factors influences whether transplanted organs are accepted by the host. Information is badly needed on these factors and on the availability of organs suitable for transplantation.

Professor Gerhard Opelz of Heidelberg University made this point at a Heidelberg seminar on dialysis and kidney transplants.

Trials indicated, he said, that kidney transplant success rates could be improved by over 10 per cent by optimising allocation.

"There is, in particular, an urgent need to extend organ exchange facilities for certain risk groups throughout Europe, contrary to the present practice.

"That is the only way in which compatibility can be ensured for as many patients as possible."

At the transplantation immunology unit of Heidelberg University department of immunology, Professor Opelz has been associated since 1982 with an international data survey.

The aim of the survey is to compile and collate as many facts and figures as possible, bearing in mind that all manner of details are of immense importance for organ allocation.

At present 262 kidney transplant centres and 85 heart transplant centres in 38 countries are associated with the survey.

The data of nearly 70,000 kidney transplants and over 5,000 heart transplant operations have been filed so far.

According to statistics kept by the board of trustees for dialysis and kidney transplants 12,495 kidney transplant operations were carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1970 and 1988, including 1,778 last year.

The board, set up in 1969, has established over 100 dialysis centres and provides staff, organisational and financial back-up for 27 transplant centres.

About 5,000 German kidney patients now live with a successful kidney transplant. A further 6,000 of the 20,000-plus dialysis patients in the Federal Republic are on the transplant waiting list. On average they wait three years before a suitable kidney is available. In the medium term at least 2,400 transplants a year are planned.

Professor Rudolf Pichlmayr of Hanover medical school said kidney transplants were an established technique, while heart transplants had a "high success rate."

About 250 heart transplants a year are carried out in the Federal Republic, plus 140 liver transplants last year — with a "growing degree of success."

Transplantation of both heart and lung and of the pancreas is still at the development stage.

An estimated 400 bone marrow transplant operations a year are carried out in the Federal Republic. Transplants of parts of the eye and the ear are also undertaken.

Donor organs are still in short supply, the experts agreed. Professor Pichlmayr felt demand would exceed supply even if as many people as possible were prepared to donate organs and medical cooperation in this sector was first-rate.

The problems are complex. They concern not only individuals who might like to donate organs after their death but also their next of kin should they

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■ ENERGY

Solar-cell plant to isolate hydrogen from water

Neunburg vorm Wald is a small town in the rural district of Schwandorf. Here in north-eastern Bavaria the public hearing on planning permission for the controversial nuclear fuel processing plant in nearby Wackersdorf was held a year ago.

The Wackersdorf site is only a few miles away. The "No to Wackersdorf!" posters are still flyposted on hayricks, but they now belong to the past.

The future is what matters: a solar power future in the wake of what, since the Wackersdorf project was axed by the Bonn government, must now be seen as a nuclear past.

Bayernwerk, the local power utility, has been engaged in planning and construction work on its solar hydrogen project here for three years.

When the solar power unit goes on line in January it will be a world premiere, a first step from the research lab to practical power generation.

It will be the acid test of an alternative energy concept for the next millennium, not just the next century.

Solar cells will generate power that is not just fed straight into the grid; instead, it will operate an electrolysis unit.

The unit will convert pure water, H_2O, into its components: hydrogen and oxygen.

The hydrogen will then be tapped as an ideal energy storage medium. It can be stored and reconverted at very little cost into heating, propulsion or plain electric power.

What makes the concept so fascinating is the virtually unlimited availability of the basic ingredients solar power and water.

At no stage in the cycle are harmful substances produced. The only by-product of hydrogen combustion is water.

So in theory it is an unlimited, environment-friendly cycle accompanied by neither the shortage of oil, the radioactivity of atomic energy and the climate catastrophe that threatens to result from burning fossil fuels.

Expense is the practical drawback. A solar panel sufficient to power a kitchen stove costs DM10,000. Seventy of these panels with a capacity of 300 kilowatts are arranged on a slope near Neunburg.

Then there is the electrolysis plant, the hydrogen pipelines and storage tanks, a variety of combustion units and the filling station for an experimental car that runs on hydrogen instead of conventional motor fuel.

The project will cost DM70m, half met by research grants from the Federal and Bavarian governments, half shared by Bayernwerk, Siemens, MBB, Linde and BMW.

At present cost comparison with other forms of energy is still most depressing:

● One kilowatt of electric power generated from solar cells at Neunburg will cost about two marks, as against 20 pfennigs by conventional means.

● Harnessing solar power to produce hydrogen costs a further 50 pfennigs to a mark per kilowatt-hour, making solar hydrogen far more expensive than, say, conventional heating oil.

But these figures disregard two factors. The first is that solar cells and electrolysis units seem sure to cost much less in the decades ahead.

Neither has yet been fully researched and reached the stage where it is technically trouble-free.

The second is that they ignore the follow-up cost of oil and nuclear power. Power utilities won't have to foot the bill for the greenhouse effect or a nuclear accident.

Yet the operator, SWB, short for Solar Hydrogen Bavaria (German initials, of course), a company owned by the firms associated with the project, is keen to dispel exaggerated expectations.

"Solar hydrogen technology is an option," says energy engineer Martin Fuchs, "but we can't tell whether it will be a major success."

SWB's role is not to launch the technology but to gain initial experience of it. Solar hydrogen might then establish itself here and there some time next century, Fuchs says, sounding a note of distinctly guarded optimism.

Is he serious? Or is Bayernwerk merely selling an ecological line that is intended to please anti-nuclear campaigners?

It may be window-dressing in part, but not entirely, given that Bayernwerk has clear and specific interests to pursue.

"We must do everything possible to ensure that we have the technology at the ready should we need it," Herr Fuchs says.

What he means is that solar hydrogen may not come into its own in the Federal Republic, but if it does, then Bayernwerk aims to profit from it.

Bavarian Greens suspect the utility of an entirely different motive. They see the project not as a stepping stone to a great leap forward but as a covert attempt to improve Bayernwerk's earnings from its nuclear power stations.

Bayernwerk isn't the least interested in solar energy as such, they argue. What the utility wants is to use surplus nuclear power to produce hydrogen in the 1990s.

"The solar part of the project isn't serious," surmises the Greens' energy expert Rudi Ammansberger.

"All that is seriously intended is research into hydrogen technology and the storage of surplus electric power generated by nuclear power stations."

The utility is not prepared to rule out this possible linkage of atomic energy and hydrogen, but it is said not, by any means, to be the sole consideration.

The link might be forged, Herr Fuchs says, but only in "entirely hypothetical circumstances." Such as if oil were banned on account of the climate problems it caused.

"Inexpensive hydrogen would then be needed, and to begin with it will clearly be less expensive to produce by means of atomic energy," he says. *Felix Berth*

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 4 August 1989)

Transplants

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suddenly die and their organs be suitable for use in transplant surgery.

To donate or not to donate. The decision can be extremely difficult, with much heartsearching and heartache, if the potential donor has not made his views absolutely clear beforehand.

Many people are worried that once they have committed themselves as organ donors, doctors might be tempted to sign a death certificate prematurely, as it were.

Professor Pichlmayr said everything must be done to save a potential organ donor's life. Once all efforts have failed the donor must be certified dead before an organ is removed.

"No matter how urgently a recipient needs a transplant," he told the Heidelberg seminar, "there must be no exception to these two golden rules."

Yet most people are aware of the unnerving concept of brain death. These are cases in which the patient's entire brain is damaged beyond repair but his body is still functioning.

Professor Klaus Roosen of Giessen University said brain death meant the death of the individual in medical, legal and theological terms.

Modern intensive care and mechanical respiration were alone able to postpone the death of other organs by between a few hours and a few days.

According to the 1986 revised guidelines of the Federal Medical Chamber on brain death diagnosis, the diagnosis must comprise three stages.

All brain functions must be shown to have ceased. This condition must also be shown to be final and irrevocable.

This must be certified separately by two doctors, one of whom must have long experience of intensive care of patients with serious brain damage.

If an organ transplant is envisaged, both certifying doctors must have nothing whatever to do with the transplant surgeons and their associates.

Professor Roosen outlined case histories to show how important it was to be "frank, earnest and truthful" in caring for the next of kin.

Next of kin who felt confident in the doctors in charge of the case were likelier to agree to an organ donation. In between 80 and 90 per cent of the cases he treated they did so, he said.

That ought not to be the end of the matter. It would help the nearest and dearest to get over the shock if they were to be told in person by the doctor in charge of the case that the organ transplant had been a success.

"It was comforting to feel that an organ donated by one's nearest and dearest had saved another patient's life — or at least made the patient's life more normal and worth living."

Rolf H. Simen/df

(General-Anzeiger, Bonn, 5 August 1989)

Springer fight

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at a price of DM250m: "A sale of SAT 1 is not under discussion."

From Kirch's point of view selling SAT 1 would make no sense at all.

The background to his fight for more influence on Springer is his dream of an interlocking publishing-TV network.

Tamm is also fascinated by the idea. Not, however, in cooperation with Kirch. According to Tamm "making concessions to Kirch means submission. But we don't want to be eaten up and we don't want an army of occupation here."

The power struggle is likely to continue. During the four-year fight to decide who inherits the Springer empire there have been numerous and completely surprising about-turns.

Marie-Luise Hauch-Fleck

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 4 August 1989)

FRONTIERS

Getting an old pal to sell the Bee Em Dubbelyou



Henry Ford is reputed once to have said: "Half of my advertising expenses have been thrown out the window — I just don't know which half."

The age-old fear of all advertisers that much of the money they spend on advertising might be a useless investment is deeply-rooted.

This explains why the marketing and advertising branches today have a sophisticated set of marketing and opinion research instruments to keep losses to a minimum.

Apart from the optimum translation of the advertising message into pictures, words and sounds a series of psychological and by and large irrational factors play an important part in the successful sale of a product or service.

The starting-point is the basic function of all advertising: it must establish public confidence, based on appeal, competence and credibility.

Advertising generally uses key stimuli. Just like individuals usually try to make a good and likable impression on others advertising tries to present products, services and individuals in an appealing environment.

The function of prominent persons as positive examples and leading figures can be successfully used for this kind of presentation.

Instead of ideal-type or anonymous models, for example, Germany's top sports ace, Boris Becker, explains why he keeps an account at a certain big bank or popular actor Günter Strack recommends a particular brand of spirits.

The Dutch compere Rudi Carell speaks in his inimitable German-with-Dutch-accent about the benefits of a certain food chain and Thomas Gottschalk, another popular TV compere, praises the mincemeat roll sold by a major American fast food chain.

On posters and in magazine advertisements smiling and laughing VIPs can be seen with their respective products; in advertising TV and radio spots they recommend the products of their clients.

These stars not only owe their advertising potential to their special physical or intellectual assets, but to the fact that they appear regularly on the screen.

In today's television age, an age in which moods, opinions, entertainment and life-styles are mainly conveyed via TV, the stars of the screen are the real leading figures in society.

Anyone who regularly smiles into the living rooms of millions of Germans is so well-known that they can popularise products solely on the basis of the aura of their personalities.

This at any rate is the strategy pursued by many advertisers.

However, the simple equation — use of prominent persons equals sales success — does not always work out.

The appearance of a star on behalf of a certain product is a risky business and can be counterproductive.

The professional advertiser and sales promotion specialist, Pal Berkovics, from Cologne warns against the widespread mistaken belief that a popular name alone is enough to guarantee a sales boost for a given product. He explains that the most important aspect is credibility when a prominent personality is combined with a brand article or a service.

The product and the person presenting that product must suit one another.

The elderly actor Willy Millowitsch from Cologne, for example, would not be the right man to sell luxury cars, French delicatessen or household cleansing agents.

Ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, on the other hand, is a "trustworthy and competent person of respect", who would probably stand a good chance of selling any product, especially to women.

Unfortunately, Schmidt has not so far been willing to advertise products, Berkovics regrets with a grin.

There are plenty of examples of extreme "miscasting." The legendary actor Curt Jürgens of all people was involved in one of the biggest flops in advertising after he advertised Maxwell instant coffee.

No-one in Germany was able seriously to believe that Jürgens, the popular tough guy and passionate whisky drinker, would be willing to exchange his glass for a cup of coffee.

Worse still for the advertisers, Jürgens had to live with a pacemaker at that time and had to be particularly careful when drinking coffee.

Jürgens himself was able to earn DM2m for his advertising stint, but the damage to the product's image was tremendous.

The promotion of the well-known TV star and lover of fast sports cars, Petra Schürmann, on behalf of bus and rail transport was also a poor choice. No-one believed that a woman like Frau Schürmann goes shopping on the bus.

Howls of laughter resounded throughout the advertising branch when Harald Juhnke, an entertainer known to be very fond of his drink, started advertising kefir and dairy products.

Berkovics also finds it difficult to understand why so many firms are keen on obtaining soccer players to advertise their products, especially since their popularity is so varying and dependent on performance.

Would a football fan, for example, buy a product advertised week in and week out on the jersey of a player whose team keeps on losing or is threatened by relegation. Advertising and sales promotion using well-known personalities, therefore, have their drawbacks.



Some of Pal Berkovics' clients are also his friends. (Photo: Helmer Wessel)

They require an instinctive feel for the market, psychological sensitivity and many years of experience in dealing with artists and products.

Budapest-born Pal Berkovics, who came to Germany as a poor refugee in 1957 after the Hungarian rebellion and who discovered his true "vocation" after a few years in show business, is one of the experts in the field of VIP marketing.

The Cologne agency he set up in 1960 specialised right from the start in this line of business and has been realising the concept of "promotion with prominent personalities" ever since.

His recipe for success is based on two basic ingredients: either he lets himself be inspired by media reports on the stars and then offers suitable firms a certain "package of ideas" (conceptional planning plus artists) or he accepts a commission and then looks for the appropriate prominent personalities.

What sounds so easy in theory requires full commitment round the clock and a special nose for opportunities of creating an appealing image for a certain brand or service as well as for the entertaining transfer of information.

During countless meetings at trade exhibitions, field service congresses, dealers' conferences, on-the-spot promotion campaigns in towns and cities, publishing houses, department stores, marketing chains and individual firms Berkovics has long since proven that he he one of the best experts in this difficult field.

The small Hungarian's greatest coup so far was the engagement of Joan Collins for the presentation of a new BMW convertible to the dealer's association of the Bavarian motor manufacturer.

The international star, whose intrigues and affairs are screened to a fascinated TV audience in over 80 countries, fitted this white-and-blue luxury product like a glove.

It took Berkovics many days of lobbying in Paris and a great deal of personal doggedness to persuade Joan Collins to put in an appearance in Germany, something she had previously always refused.

After Thomas Gottschalk interviewed her during a talk show about her role in *Dynasty* and she then exclaimed: "I love Bee Em Dubbleyou" the 2,000 BMW dealers reeled over with glee.

She now also advertises the Bavarian luxury limousine in the USA — advertising which is really priceless.

Pal Berkovics is a lively person with the cunningness many Hungarians are reputed to have and a warm-hearted manner.

Today he claims to have over 500 artists and prominent persons in his file, which means he can find a suitable partner for every campaign.

The naturalised inhabitant of Cologne is a prominent personality himself.

He knows almost everybody and works together with agencies and firms of all sizes.

International stars of the cinema and TV screens or in the theatre and sports worlds are not only among his clientele, but also — and this is the biggest compliment — some of his best friends.

Lutz Kuche

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 4 August 1989)

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same mistake. He is regarded as a strategist with a taut style of working. Under his direction, the group has doubled its Americanisation efforts.

He followed an American example by dividing the group into six divisions. He has not been able to follow American practice on structuring the board, however. There, the board is a mixture of management and supervision, unlike in Germany, where they are separate.

But it is said that the supervisory board at Bertelsmann has more work to do than other supervisory boards.

Wössner's divisions are:

1. Printing and production in Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, USA, Brazil and Colombia.

2. Music and video, mainly in Germany and the USA.

3. Electronic media. Private television (RTL Plus, a German channel) and radio and films (Ufa, a German maker and distributor).

4. Publishing. Mainly in Germany and the USA.

5. Book clubs. Everywhere.

6. Gruner + Jahr.

Mohn, Wössner and Co have been active in America where they bought RCA and the Bantam Doubleday Dell publishing group in quick succession.

They used cash and not, as is common in America, credit. Despite the expansion, Bertelsmann has now slipped back to become number two in the world after Time Warner.

If the new arrangement will make Time Warner any more competitive remains the question. The Time Warner marriage can thank the competition from Paramount, which forced Time to change its strategy of merging in friendly fashion with Warner into buying up shares and swallowing losses of 14 billion dollars.

This is why media experts think the new giant will be concerned with itself for some time to come. They also think it doesn't have the cash for acquisitions and might have to sell some of its companies to pay off the debt.

That's why many now think that Bertelsmann's position is stronger than ever. It could even find itself acquiring those parts of Time Warner that might be sold. This would also improve the Americans' ability to get into Europe when the Internal Market comes into existence at the end of 1992.

Dieter Fuchs

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 4 August 1989)

HORIZONS

Motorbike girls like riding in their own lane

Tina's favourite hobby can be seen dangling on her silver necklace: a motorbike.

"It got hold of me when I was 18," says the 28-year-old. The other women in the group start to smile. The motorbiking habit "got hold" of most of them sooner or later.

"Women on wheels" is the name written in glittering letters on the little flag on the table.

Once a week the women bikers meet in a local restaurant to talk about their hobby.

There are 20 members in the Berlin regional group of the German section (set up in 1985) of the International Association of Women Motoryclists.

The group hopes to attract more members. There are only rough estimates of the total number of female motorcyclists.

According to the Berlin vehicle registration office 31,375 motorbikes were registered in the city at the end of June, although there is no breakdown according to men or women.

The Federal Motoring Office in Flensburg, however, does have a sex-specific statistical rundown, albeit not quite as up-to-date.

Roughly ten per cent of the motorbikes registered nationwide in the middle of 1987 were registered under a woman's name. In Berlin the average is probably higher.

A perusal of the monthly magazine of the "Women on Wheels" club gives an idea of what the members discuss when they start talking shop.

Safety training, repair courses or how to cope with the hobby, being a mother and taking care of children are just some of the topics.

Articles like the one headlined "My Guzzi and me — the start of a beautiful friendship" are just as common as indignant articles about the outrageous advertisements of some motorbike manufacturers.

Strongly worded letters are published to manufacturers who still feel that horsepower qualities should be combined with the presentation of plenty of naked female flesh.

When buying their bikes women are faced by problems men rarely have.

"Many bikes are too high," 49-year-old Verena complains and explains how she set about adjusting the motorbike to her height.

She had soles put on her shoes which were 1 centimetre thicker than normal and then reduced the padding on her saddle.

As many of the bikes are so heavy they should all be laid on the ground first before being bought so as to see whether the women can — in an emergency — lift them up. "Most dealers, of course, don't like the idea," says Verena.

Women also have to take time to try on headgear and clothing because many helmets and jackets are much too big.

Repair workshops also come in for their fair share of criticism.

Women are often treated as if they do not have the faintest idea about what makes a motorbike tick.

The "Women on Wheels" are not too keen on do-it-yourself repairs, since electronics play such an important part nowadays. The lady riders, however, do "small things" like tightening the chains or changing the oil.

Club members offer special driving and repair courses for beginners.

Women motorcyclists appear to attach more importance to careful driving than their male roadrunners.

After 10 years of driving practice Tina's advice is something which is almost taken for granted in the group:

"Before I overtake I don't stare into the countryside, but keep my eyes on the front wheels of the cars ahead."

Tina says that she notices straight away if a car intends pulling out.

Commenting on her driving style she adds that clever drivers give way at the right moment.

In the opinion of the women motorcyclists some men apparently feel obliged to show "what they can."

This explains why the women really enjoy their women-only rides, which are often organised on a larger scale abroad.

They claim that everything is much more peaceful than in mixed groups, the distance to the driver in front is correct, and there is less wild overtaking."

They all like group trips because long drives on the motorway are boring.

Ursula, at the age of 55 the oldest woman in the Berlin group, gave an example of how this lack of communication can influence the choice of vehicle.

She obtained her motorcycle licence in 1953. Her husband, who had no licence, sat on the pillion seat.

"After a while we decided to buy an Isetta (a tiny car) just because we wanted to talk during the journey," she explains.

Pretty soon she will be racing down to Italy — on two wheels, of course.

The group has differing views on the speed limit imposed on the Avus in Berlin (before the war, the Avus was a car race track. It has now been incorporated into Berlin's autobahn system. The Berlin administration recently imposed a speed limit — there is usually no speed limit on autobahns — for environmental reasons.)

None feel that the limit is absolutely ridiculous. Tina feels that anyone who tears along the Avus must be crazy anyway.

The women do not feel as if they are "something special", even though Tina only saw male motorcyclists during a recent trip up the Italian mountain roads.

After she parked her bike outside of a restaurant one old man came up to Dagmar and asked "Is that a woman underneath the helmet?".

The women react self-confidently when things like this happen; they just laugh it off.

Hella Kaiser

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 6 August 1989)



Easy riding. (Photo: Nowak/Der Tagesspiegel)

When Sibylle gave up the taxis, it wasn't just for a stunt

Hannoversche Allgemeine

She began in a small way. With things like brawls. Brawls? That's no problem for a woman like Sibylle Brandl.

She is a small minority of one in her career, for which there isn't even an appropriate name in the German language. She is a "stunt frau". She doesn't know of any other in Germany. She and her husband, Werner, are a team of two.

Everyone knows stuntmen, but at least in Germany, the idea of a woman doing outlandish things in front of a film camera was unknown until recently.

Sibylle Brandl used to have a taxi business in Munich (two vehicles) before she decided to go into the stunt business. She and Werner moved on to a farm seven years ago and practised doing stunts in the garden, in the fields and in the barns.

When they thought they were ready, they sent video cassettes to various firms in the film and television industries — there were 250 of them in the Munich telephone book alone. Several showed interest.

So they became a stunt team. She explains about her progress: "At first the tendency is to do things that make great demands on body control. But later, the head becomes more important."

It's not only a matter of making an elegant fall or jack-knifing through a window. Directors want much more something more choreographically convincing which are appropriate for the script.

The Brandl couple think about how certain people would act in given situations. For example, a father involved in a punch-up is likely to act differently from a rocker.

During the learning process, she was advised by a British stunt coordinator whose job it was to stay by a director and discuss ideas about how stunts should be carried out. It took three years before they became known collectively as the "Stunt Crew Munich."

Werner says now: "At first, we thought it was nonsense for a woman to take on a job like this." He is a trained car mechanic and now builds himself the apparatus and props needed for the job.



Sibylle Brandl refuses to play with fire. (Photo: private)

Among them are a tower to jump from, a tight-rope and, invisible (to the camera), treble strength roll-bars fitted internally to a car. He says technology plays an important role.

It was a job that consisted of 27 career skills (he once counted them). You had to be a cabinet maker, a glazier and a welder. You needed to have a certain capacity to be a cameraman and a director. You needed a certain business sense.

A stunt person must be a cat burglar, be able to fall from the eighth storey of a building and must be able to drive a car to within a hair's breadth of having a head-on collision. You must be able to somersault over cars and perform daredevil riding manoeuvres on horses.

Frau Brandl says: "There are certain things that a woman's body is not so suitable for, but when you know your own body, you can develop an appropriate technique."

When she springs out of a window, she goes feet first because in this way she can land better and reduce the strain on the spine.

But she thinks not so much as a woman than as a stunt woman and either accepts or rejects job offers regardless of whether it is suitable for a woman or not.

It used to be that actresses were portrayed by stunt men for dangerous acts. Frau Brandl has studied how women would act.

Since her first contract, when she somersaulted into a sports car, some directors have rewritten scripts and substituted women for men because they know that Frau Brandl can play the parts.

Today, two thirds of all the contracts for Stunt Crew Munich specifically want Frau Brandl, her husband concedes without a trace of envy.

She says: "I only reject offers if they're really too bad." She will not play with fire; she has too much respect for it.

On the other hand, she managed to drive a motor bike through a herd of sheep without causing injury because, she says, she can get to grips with how animals feel as well.

Rolf Linkenheil

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